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McNeal: Toward a "Civil Gideon" Under the Montana Constitution

TOWARD A "CIVIL GIDEON" UNDER THE
MONTANA CONSTITUTION: PARENTAL RIGHTS
AS THE STARTING POINT
Mary Helen McNeal*

To the extent justice depends on charity .

.

. it is destined to be

unequal.1
I. INTRODUCTION

Litigants appear regularly in Montana courts without the
assistance of counsel. In disputes ranging from abuse and
neglect to landlord-tenant, consumer, public benefits, social
security, insurance, dissolution, child support and parenting
issues arising in administrative proceedings, Montana's courts
of limited jurisdiction, the district courts, and the Montana
Supreme Court, many litigants do not have access to attorney
assistance. 2 Some elect not to be represented, but many low or
moderate income individuals cannot secure free legal assistance
and cannot afford to hire lawyers.
Few would disagree that many of these litigants would
benefit from counsel.
Many believe counsel should be appointed for them. This
article proposes theories under which Montana courts should be
obligated to provide counsel to indigent parties in certain
circumstances, focusing on the fundamental right to parent as
* Professor and Clinic Director, University of Montana School of Law. The author would
like to thank the Boalt Hall Social Justice Faculty who offered valuable suggestions at
an early presentation of this paper, and to the participants at the University of Montana
Law Review's 2004 symposium on Children and the Law, who also contributed to the
development of these ideas. Special thanks go to Mark Kende and Betsy Griffing, who
read and commented on an earlier draft. The article could not have been completed
without the able research assistance of Elizabeth Mazur of the University of California
at Berkeley and Merianne Stansbury of the University of Montana School of Law.
Finally, thank you to Geri Fox for word processing assistance. All errors remain mine.

1. Justice Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal Access to Justice:ComparingAccess to Justice
in the United States and Other Industrial Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 83, 101
(2000) [hereinafter Access to Justice].
2. Attorneys are not permitted in Montana's small claims courts unless all parties
are represented. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-35-505 (2003).
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an example.
The Montana Constitution is a unique document providing
important individual rights absent from the United States
Constitution and many other state constitutions. Examples
include the right to a clean and healthful environment, 3 the
right to privacy, 4 the right to culturally appropriate education, 5
and the right to dignity.6 Selected Montana constitutional
rights, when recognized together, create a limited right to
counsel. This article will analyze these theories and lay the
7
foundation for the development of a "civil Gideon" in Montana.
It will conclude that the administration of justice and dignity
clauses, working in tandem, create the strongest argument in
support of the right to counsel. This right is most compelling
when additional fundamental rights also are at stake, such as
the right to parent.
Part II analyzes the Montana Constitution's administration
of justice and dignity clauses and demonstrates how they
support a right to counsel in limited situations. It also briefly
addresses other potential legal theories, including Montana's
due process clause and unenumerated rights provision, and a
relevant statutory provision. Part III analyzes the fundamental
rights that arise in the parenting context, a potential starting
point for the development of a civil Gideon. Part IV applies the
constitutional rights articulated above to the parenting context,
concluding that the right to counsel exists in these civil cases.
Finally, Part V outlines general recommendations for the
Montana courts on successfully implementing a "civil Gideon"
for indigent litigants.

3.
4.

MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 and art. IX, § 1.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.

5.

MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1

6. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4. According to Professors Larry Ellison and Fritz
Snyder, the Montana Constitution's Declaration of Rights contains seventeen provisions
not contained in the federal document. LARRY M. ELLISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE
MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 20 (G. Alan Tarr, ed., Greenwood

Press 2001).
7. The term "civil Gideon" refers to the landmark decision Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel requires the court to appoint counsel to indigent criminal
defendants. The court concluded that certain fundamental rights are also safeguarded
against state action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution is one of
the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed "necessary to insure fundamental
human rights of life and liberty." Id. at 343, (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
462 (1938)).
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II. A "CIVIL GIDEON" UNDER THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION:
LEGAL THEORIES

There are numerous theories under the Montana
Constitution that support a civil Gideon. In Montana, as
elsewhere, state constitutions represent the best strategy for
creating greater rights to counsel in civil cases.8 The basic
principles employed in interpreting the Montana Constitutionthat it creates a variety of individual rights that do not exist at
the federal level, is to be interpreted more broadly than the
United States Constitution, and is a cohesive set of interlocking
principles-support the right of indigent litigants to courtappointed counsel in certain situations.
consistently
has been
Constitution
The Montana
interpreted more broadly than the Federal Constitution; the
Montana Supreme Court has held that it need not be
constrained by interpretations of the Federal Constitution. 9
Montana constitutional provisions that have been interpreted
more broadly include the equal protection1 ° and due process 1
clauses. For example, the court created a unique middle level of
equal protection scrutiny, finding that for certain rights which
are not fundamental rights but which are referenced in the
constitution, the court should conduct a balancing test,
evaluating whether the State's classification is reasonable and

8. For an interesting discussion of the Montana constitution and its relationship
to similar documents, see G. Alan 'Tarr, The Montana Constitution: A National
Perspective, 64 MONT. L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Montana Constitution] (noting that
the 1972 Montana Constitution reflects a blending of two constitutional reform
movements of the Twentieth Century, one emphasizing changes in fundamental laws
and the other limits on governmental powers). For a discussion of general principles for
interpreting state constitutions, see, e.g., James A. Gardner, State ConstitutionalRights
as Resistance to NationalPower: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91
GEO. L.J. 1003 (2003) (arguing that state recognition of greater protection for individual
rights may ultimately influence reasoning in federal constitutional cases); Daniel B.
Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N. M. L. REV. 271 (1998)
(arguing for distinguishable principles for interpreting the federal and state
constitutions, and suggesting a "trans-state constitutional theory").
9. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Mont., 1999 MT 261, 41, 296 Mont 361, 41, 989 P.2d
364,
41 (stating Montana's Constitution affords significantly broader protection than
does the federal constitution due to the explicit privacy right); Dorwart v. Caraway, 2002
MT 240, 84, 312 Mont. 1, 84, 58 P.2d 128, 84 (Nelson, J., concurring) [hereinafter
"Dowart IF'] (noting that members of the constitutional convention intended for the
Montana Constitution "to stand on its own footing and to provide individuals with
fundamental rights and protections far broader than those available through the federal
system." Id. at 94 (internal citations omitted)).
10. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
11.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 17.
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whether its interest in classifying persons according to a certain
characteristic is more important than the individuals' rights at
stake. 12 Montana's equal protection clause also applies to
13
private as well as state actors.
This trend to interpret state constitutions more broadly
than identical provisions in the United States Constitution has
been called "the new judicial federalism."'14 The recent pattern
of devolution of power to the states increases the role of state
constitutions in policy making and "rights debates."1 5 As a
result, state constitutions provide the best vehicle for creating
more rights for indigent litigants unable to secure counsel.16
The Montana Supreme Court also has held that Montana's
constitution should be interpreted as a coherent document. In a
seminal case challenging restrictions on abortions performed by
physicians' assistants, Justice Nelson wrote as follows for the

12. Butte Cmty. Union v. Lewis, 219 Mont. 426, 434, 712 P.2d 1309, 1313-14
(1986) (invalidating a Montana welfare statute that classified individuals eligible for
general assistance benefits on the basis of age). For further discussion, see infra, Section
II(A)(4)(b).
13. See Dorwart II,
75 (recognizing private causes of action for damages for
violation of state constitutional rights). See also Mark S. Kende, Technology's Future
Impact on State ConstitutionalLaw: The Montana Example, 64 MONT. L. REV. 273 (2003)
(arguing that technological advances will result in the Montana Supreme Court applying
the state constitution to private actors in addition to the state government).
14. Tarr, Montana Constitution, supra note 8, at 19.
15. Id. at 18.
16. Efforts to create a civil Gideon are burgeoning across the country and
frequently rely on state constitutional provisions. John Nethercut, "This Issue Will Not
Go Away": Continuing to Seek the Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 481 (Nov.-Dec. 2004) (describing efforts to develop "Civil Gideon" litigation and
organize a national coalition focused on this issue). These strategies have taken the
form of litigation, see, e.g., Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A.2d 114. (Md. 2003) (holding that
conditions imposed on parental custody violated the mother's due process rights, and
that this finding mooted the right to counsel issue. In a strong concurrence, three
justices admonished the majority for failing to address the right to counsel issue, stating
that the Maryland constitutional provisions of "due process" and "law of the land" allow
Maryland courts not to be constrained by decisions of the United States Supreme Court
interpreting the federal constitutional counterparts); scholarship, see, e.g., Lisa Brodoff,
Susan McClellan & Elizabeth Anderson, Access to Justice-A Call for Civil Gideon: The
ADA, One Avenue to Appointed Counsel Before a Full Civil Gideon, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 609, 611 (2004) (arguing that many disabled litigants need accommodations and
that attorneys are the only way to "provide the knowledge, energy, strategy, translation
and understanding to mount a case or provide a defense for those whose disabilities
block their ability to do so pro se."); Deborah Perluss, Access to Justice-A Call For Civil
Gideon: Washington's ConstitutionalRight to Counsel in Civil Cases:Access to Justice v.
Fundamental Interest, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 571 (2004) (describing an access-based
approach to the constitutional right to counsel under Washington State Constitution's
access to justice provision); and a "working group" organized by the Public Justice Center
in Baltimore, Maryland, http://www.publicjustice.org (last viewed October 31, 2004).
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court:
Montana's constitution, and especially the Declaration of Rights,
is not simply a cookbook of disconnected and discrete rules written
with the vitality of an automobile insurance policy. Rather, our
Constitution, and in particular its Declaration of Rights,
encompasses a cohesive set of principles, carefully drafted and
committed to an abstract ideal of just government. It17is a compact
of overlapping and redundant rights and guarantees.

These basic principles assist in creating new interpretations
of the right of indigent litigants to court-appointed counsel. This
is particularly true when there are liberty interests at stake.
Applying these principles to the administration of justice and
dignity clauses results in the conclusion that court-appointed
counsel should be provided for indigent civil litigants. This case
is strongest when fundamental rights are at stake, such as the
liberty interest in parenting that arises in abuse and neglect
8
proceedings and in contested custody cases.'
A. The "Administrationof Justice"Provision
1. Introduction
Like many other state constitutions, the Montana
Constitution contains what is referred to as an "open courts"
provision. More accurately characterized as an "administration
of justice" provision, 19 this section states, in pertinent part, as

17. Armstrong, 1999 MT 261,
71-72, 296 Mont 361,
71-72, 989 P.2d 364,
71-72 (holding that the statute violated Montanans' right to privacy, but also referencing
other fundamental rights in the constitution, such as dignity, equal protection, due
process and freedom of religion and speech). But see Tarr, Understanding State
Constitutions, supra note 8, at 1183-85 (arguing that most state constitutions do not
have a coherence of design).
18. In 1997, the Montana legislature changed the language in applicable statutes
from "custody" to "parenting." See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-234 (2003) (requiring
parents involved in a legal separation, marriage dissolution or parenting proceedings to
file a proposed parenting plan to be incorporated into a final decree). Although
technically there is no longer a "contested custody dispute," many parents still disagree
about who should have the children when, and often these disputes are quite "contested."
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burk, 2002 MT 173, 310 Mont. 498, 51 P.3d 1149 (modifying a
parenting plan that had been adopted "after a contested custody hearing" following
dissolution of the parents' marriage in 1998). To conclude that the change in statutory
language has resulted in different behaviors by parents would be purely speculative.
19. The characterization of this provision as the "administration of justice" clause
is consistent with its title in the Montana Constitution and the fact that it embodies
many concepts in addition to that of "open courts." Interestingly, Reginald Heber Smith,
writing in 1919 in his seminal work Justice and the Poor, made the following comments
about the administration of justice:
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follows: "Section 16. The administration of justice. Courts of
justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy
afforded to every injury of person, property, or character....
Right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
20
delay."
Up to thirty-nine state constitutions have "right to remedy"
provisions. 2' Many of those provisions also contain "open courts"
clauses. 22 This provision provides a variety of rights-to open
courts, to a remedy, and "right and justice" "without sale, denial
or delay." This section explores the origins of these provisions
and comparable provisions in other state constitutions, how the
Montana Supreme Court has interpreted section 16, and the
application of these collective rights to a civil Gideon. Advocates
for Montanans without the resources to secure legal counsel
rightfully look to this provision for assistance in addressing
these unmet legal needs.
Article II, section 16 results in a right to counsel in civil
cases under two theoretical frameworks. Section 16, in and of
itself, creates a fundamental right. The rights afforded in
section 16 prove fundamental both because they are found in the
Declaration of Rights and because they are rights without which
other constitutionally protected rights would have little
Once the right of access in section 16 is
meaning. 23
characterized as a fundamental right, classifications impinging
It is the wide disparity between the ability of the richer and poorer classes to
utilize the machinery of law which is, at bottom, the cause of the present
Denial of justice to the poor is due to the
unrest and dissatisfaction.
conditions, imposed by our traditional system, upon which alone can suits be
brought and conducted. There is something tragic in the fact that a plan and
method of administering justice, honestly designed to make efficient and
certain that litigation on which at last all rights depend, should result in
rearing insuperable obstacles in the path of those who most need protection, so
that litigation becomes impossible, rights are lost, and wrongs go unredressed.
REGINALD SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 15 (1919). Smith also emphasized the critical
role of counsel and the inability of the poor to afford legal counsel. Id. at 31-34.
20. The omitted section, irrelevant for this discussion, states as follows: "No person
shall be deprived of this full legal redress for injury incurred in employment for which
another person may be liable except as to fellow employees and his immediate employer
who hired him if such .immediate employer provides coverage under the Workmen's
Compensation Laws of this state." MONT. CONST., art II, §16.
21. David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197 (1992). See
also Ned Miltenberg, The Revolutionary 'Right to a Remedy,' TRIAL, Mar. 1998, at 48
(noting that thirty-eight states have right to remedy provisions).
22.

JENNIFER FRIESEN, 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL

RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES §§ 6-1 to 6-3 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that twenty-seven
state constitutions require courts to be open).
23. In the Matter of C.H., 210 Mont 184, 201, 683 P.2d 931, 940 (1984).
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on that right are subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.
Alternatively, the right of access discussed in section 16 can
arise when different fundamental rights are at stake. The
fundamental right of parenting is one example. When such a
right is at stake, section 16 mandates that counsel be provided.
After outlining the background of section 16, this section will
discuss these theoretical approaches to developing a civil right
24
to counsel.
2. General History
Although there is little consensus about the meaning and
purpose of "open courts" clauses, some historical background
elucidates their role in the right to counsel context. With the
resurgence of interest in state constitutions, 25 scholars began
examining the historical antecedents of these common state
26
constitutional provisions.
24. For a discussion of the general obligations of courts to provide access, see Tenn.
v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (holding that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") is within Congress' authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
In this case alleging that Tennessee's failure to provide court access and court services to
the physically handicapped violated the ADA, the Court found a duty to accommodate to
provide citizens a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Id. Justice Stevens wrote the
following: "Each of these cases makes clear that ordinary considerations of costs and
convenience alone cannot justify a State's failure to provide individuals with a
meaningful right of access to the courts." Id. at 1994. The Court concluded that Title
II's affirmative obligations to accommodate the disabled in the administration of justice
was a "reasonable prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate end." Id.
See also Brodoff et al., supra note 16.
25. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) (arguing "[t]he legal revolution
which has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent
protective force of state law-for without it the full realization of our liberties cannot be
guaranteed"); Gardner, supra note 8 (identifying ways in which individual rights in state
constitutions can restrain the exercise of national governmental power); Tarr,
UnderstandingState Constitutions, supra note 8 (offering suggestions for creating state
constitutional jurisprudence that does not rely on theories designed for interpreting the
federal constitution).
26. See, e.g., Bari R. Burke, Constitutional Initiative 30: What Constitutional
Rights Did Montanans Surrender in Hopes of Securing Liability Insurance?,48 MONT. L.
REV. 53 (1987) (analyzing the foundations of Montana's tort system, including Montana
Constitution's article II, section 16 and its predecessor, article III, section 6, and the role
of the judiciary and legislature in shaping remedies); Robert Williams, Foreword: Tort
Reform and State ConstitutionalLaw, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 897 (2001) (arguing that state
constitutional provisions on open courts, right to remedy, civil jury trial, due process and
equal protection have provided successful arguments for constitutional tort reform);
Thomas R. Phillips, The ConstitutionalRight to Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1322
(2003) (arguing that Blackstone's interpretation of Coke was "concerned not merely with
the physical availability of judicial process but with the substantive opportunity to assert
claims to protect absolute rights.") Phillips also notes that "the remedies clause may
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Common historical interpretations suggest that "open court"
provisions are derived from Sir Edward Coke's interpretations of
the Magna Carta. 27 However, as Jonathan Hoffman points out,
those limited analyses fail to articulate interpretation
standards. 28 Hoffman engages in a comprehensive historical
analysis of the conditions existing at the time of the Magna
Carta, of Coke's interpretation of the Magna Carta, of the
colonies' incorporation of these ideas into their own state
constitutions, and of subsequent interpretations and analyses of
2
open courts clauses.
Hoffman argues the Magna Carta writers intended to
combat the king's influence-peddling in the judicial system. 3
Sir Edward Coke, himself an appointee of the king, faced
attempts by the king to influence cases and issued "writs of
prohibition," precluding various ministers from becoming
embroiled in disputes. 31 The king eventually removed Coke,
who ultimately published The Institutes, posthumously.
Hoffman concludes that in writing The Institutes, Coke wished
to address common law remedies and their administration, with
the goal of convincing readers that the Magna Carta protected
32
citizens from improper influence by the Crown.
Hoffman continues his analysis by examining the
incorporation of open courts provisions into state constitutions,
and raises many interesting questions about what framers
might have known about the historical underpinnings of Coke's
Institutes and the Magna Carta. Relating important events of
colonial times and their relationship with the Crown, Hoffman
notes that the same fears and concerns were present in the
colonies as existed during Coke's era-that is, that the king
impose some level of responsibility on courts to see that all citizens secure the promise of
equal justice under the law." Id. at 1344; Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before
Answers: The Ongoing Search to Understand the Origins of the Open Courts Clause, 32
RUTGERS L. J. 1005 (2001) [hereinafter Search] (arguing for further development of the
historical antecedents to this clause, and the grievances which inspired them).
27. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 26.
28. Hoffman, Search, supra note 26, at 1042.
29.
See id.
30. Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open
Courts Clause in State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1286 (1995) [hereinafter
Origins].
31. Id. at 1292-93.
32. Id. at 1287, 1293-94. But see John H. Bauman, Remedies Provisions in State
Constitutions and the Proper Role of the State Courts, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237
(1991) (arguing that the early history of these provisions does little to explain the
framers' intent).
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would interfere with the administration of justice. 33
Noting the specific language in The Institutes, Hoffman
summarizes his interpretation of Coke's work:
He was not
Coke's language reveals important nuances.
concerned merely with guaranteeing a remedy for every injury;
rather, he wanted to assure that the remedies legally available
were not to be denied because of the status of the parties. Clerics

who committed torts would be sued in a common-law court and
would not be permitted to take shelter through the intervention of
an ecclesiastical tribunal. Unpopular Puritans and Quakers, for
example, would not lose a meritorious case merely because their
34
well-placed adversary had connections to the King or Chancellor.
Because these same conditions and concerns existed in early
colonial days, the colonists adopted similar provisions. 3 5
The conclusions in Hoffman's analysis are significant in a
right to counsel debate. Many of the dangers that both Coke
and the early colonists sought to protect against, particularly
undue influence and pressures on the judiciary, exist today as
we struggle to provide meaningful access to our legal system for
all people, including the indigent. Although the perpetrators of
these pressures differ in twenty-first century America, the
dangers of such influences and the risks of failing to address
these problems are comparably serious.
3. History and Interpretationof Montana'sAdministration of
Justice Clause
Montana's administration of justice clause grants broad
rights to all Montanans to access the judicial system, and to a
This Section
fair resolution of their legal problems. 36
summarizes the Montana Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this
area, highlights trends in its interpretations of article II, section
16, and suggests future interpretive directions.
Adopted in 1898, Montana's first constitution contained an
"administration of justice" clause-article III, section 6virtually identical to the current clause,3 7 and characterized as
33. Hoffman, Origins,supra note 30, 1297.
34. Id., at 1314 (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16.
37. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 6 (1898). For a discussion of the history of
Montana's "open courts" clause, see Burke, supra note 26 (exploring the historical
antecedents to the current provision and anticipated court interpretations in light of
Constitutional Initiative 30, which provided that the provision was not to be construed
as a limit on legislative power to establish, limit, modify, or abolish claims.
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derived from the Magna Carta. 38 In 1971, Montanans convened
a Constitutional Convention which readily readopted the
"administration of justice" clause. 39 Voters approved this new
constitution in 1972.40
In her analysis of article II, section 16 written following the
passage of Constitutional Amendment 30 and prior to its
nullification by the court, Professor Bari Burke provides a useful
summary of the court's interpretations of section 16 up to this
time. 4 1 Much of the early case law interpreting section 16 and
its predecessor focuses on the "right to remedy" portion of the
clause, and the balance of power between the courts and the
judiciary.
Professor Burke argues that, historically, the
Montana Supreme Court afforded section 16 "minimal
significance." 42 Professor Burke characterizes the court's early
interpretation of section 16 as "a proclamation of judicial
protocol" 43 and quotes from Shea regarding its meaning:
It relates directly to the duties of the judicial department of
government. It means no more nor less than that, under the
provisions of the Constitution and law constituting them, the
courts must be accessible to all alike, without discrimination, at
the time or times, and the place or places, appointed for their
sitting, and afford a remedy for every wrong recognized by law as
44
being remediable in a court.

In the subsequent fifteen years, however, the court has given
section 16 increasing significance. The court's shift began with
the decision in Corrigan v. Janney, a wrongful death case
Constitutional Initiative 30 was passed by the voters on November 4, 1986, but was later
found unconstitutional on procedural grounds. State ex rel. Mont. Citizens for Pres. of
Citizens' Rights v. Waltermire, 227 Mont. 85, 738 P.2d 1255 (1987)).
38. Burke, supra note 26, at 55 n.14 (citing Stephens v. Nacey, 47 Mont. 479, 48283, 133 P. 361, 362 (1913) (since the days of Magna Carta it has been the proud boast of
the English people that their courts are open to everyone to afford a speedy remedy for
every injury to person, property or character, and to administer right and justice without
sale, denial or delay. That charter of liberty was a part of the inheritance of the original
American colonies, has been adopted in the later states, and finds expression in section
6, article III of the Constitution of Montana).
39.
The language added to the Montana Constitution in 1971 was in response to a
recent Montana Supreme Court decision holding that an employee had no legal redress
against a third party if the employer had workers' compensation coverage. Ashcraft v.
Mont. Power Co, 156 Mont. 368, 480 P. 2d 812 (1971) (absolving employer from liability
for injuries to an employee whose immediate employer is an independent contractor).
40. ELLISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 15, but the amendment was nullified by
the Waltermire decision, see supranote 37.
41.
Burke, supra note 26, at 56-57.
42. Id. at 57- 59.
43.
Burke, supra note 26, at 61.
44. Id. (quoting Shea, 55 Mont. at 533, 179 P. at 502).
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arising in a landlord-tenant context. 45 Relying on section 16, the
court overruled prior decisions and concluded that while a
"repair and deduct" remedy provides compensation for damages
to property, it is not a substitute for a personal injury or a
wrongful death claim. 46 In a more recent case relying on section
16 and other state constitutional and statutory provisions, the
court held that plaintiffs were entitled to damages against the
state for violations of the search and seizure provision, the right
47
to privacy, and due process.

45. Corrigan v. Janney, 192 Mont. 99, 103, 626 P.2d 838, 840 (1981).
46. Id.
47. Dorwart II, 2002 MT 240, 48, 312 Mont. 1, 48, 58 P.3d 128, 48. It is also
helpful to review other analyses of section 16, and what specific rights it protects. In
several old cases, the court found that section 16, and its predecessor provision, section
6, required the court to allocate resources to litigants. For example, the court ordered
that section 6 and a statute enacted to carry out its purposes mandated that the court
provide transcripts for a criminal defendant noting an appeal. Mont. ex rel. Parmenter v.
Dist. Ct. of Ravalli County, 111 Mont. 453, 453, 110 P.2d 971, 971 (1941). See also
Sullivan v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 124 Mont. 364, 368, 224 P.2d 135, 137 (1950)
(relying on article III, section 6 of the original Montana Constitution, the court held a
criminal defendant is entitled to the transcript and whatever is necessary to appeal his
conviction without costs).
In other contexts, the court has also held that section 16 does not require the
allocation of resources. See, e.g., Grooms v. Ponderosa Inn, 283 Mont 459, 469-70, 942
P.2d 699, 705 (1997) (holding that a workers compensation claimant was not denied her
right to full legal redress when she could not pay for an optional, second medical exam to
support her claim); Montana v. Lance, 222 Mont. 92, 106, 721 P.2d 1258, 1268 (1986)
(holding that a criminal defendant was not denied access to the courts for allegedly being
denied access to a library while in jail and by alleged inadequacies in his appointed
counsel's performance).
Section 16 does not provide a right to any particular remedy, see, e.g., Reeves v.
Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 110, 551 P.2d 647, 650-51 (1976) (section 16 does not
preclude court from eliminating a common law right, provided it does not interfere with
a vested right), a new cause of action, see, e.g., Nick v. Mont. Dep't of Highways, 219
Mont. 168, 175, 711 P.2d 795, 800 (1985); or attorneys' fees, see, e.g., Schuff v. A.T.
Klemens & Son, 2000 MT 357,
101, 303 Mont. 274,
101, 16 P.3d 1002,
101.
Administrative review and exhaustion of remedies requirements do not violate section
16, see, e.g., Art v. Mont. Dep't of Labor and Indus., 2002 MT 327, 313 Mont 197, 60 P.3d,
although section 16 does preclude unnecessary delay. See, e.g., Connell v. Mont. 280
Mont. 491, 498, 930 P.2d 88, 92 (1997) (holding that 44 month delay in resolving the
amount of child support owed constituted an undue delay in violation of the due process
clause and section 16).
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4. Theoretical Approaches to Section 16
a. Section 16 Creates a "FundamentalRight"
Section 16 is characterized as a fundamental right for two
reasons: for its place in the Declaration of Rights and as a "right
without which other constitutionally protected rights would
have little meaning."48 As a fundamental right, it is subject to
strict scrutiny. This section outlines the court's history of
interpretation of article 16, and its evolution to a fundamental
right.
i. Section 16 is part of the Declarationof Rights
The Corrigan case began the court's shift in interpreting
section 16, and the initiation of a fundamental rights analysis.
A subsequent case challenged the Montana Medical Malpractice
Panel Act, which required plaintiffs to submit claims to the
panel prior to filing in court. 49 Plaintiffs argued that the extra
costs and delays required by the Act effectively denied them
access to the courts. 50 The court determined that the right of
access to the courts "is not an independent fundamental right;
access is only given such a status when another fundamental
right ... is at issue .. .
Once the court began applying constitutional principles to
the right of access clause, the court launched on a long and
convoluted journey to define the right of access guaranteed by
article II, section 16. Since this decision in 1981, the court has
wavered on whether or not section 16 creates fundamental
In White v.
rights subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.
52
Montana, the plaintiff was attacked by a patient who had
escaped from Warm Springs Hospital. 53 White argued that the
statutory limits on government liability and damages affected
her fundamental right to bring an action for injuries and,
48. Butte Cmty. Union, 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309, 1312 (1986).
49. Linder v. Smith, 193 Mont. 20, 25, 629 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1981).
50. Id. The court held that the burdens imposed by the Medical Malpractice Panel
Act were rationally related to the aims of the act and the act constitutes a reasonable
response to the medical situation. Id., 193 Mont. at 31, 629 P.2d at 1193.
51. Id. 193 Mont. at 25, 629 P.2d at 1190 (emphasis added).
52. White v. State, 203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983), overruled by 238 Mont.
21, 776 P.2d 488 (1989).
53. Id. 203 Mont. at 366, 661 P.2d at 1273-74.
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therefore, the statute should be reviewed under a strict scrutiny
analysis. 54 After determining that section'16 "guarantees . . .
speedy remedy for every injury,"55 the court examined the
classifications in the statute. It held that they affected a
fundamental right, and therefore applied a strict scrutiny
analysis. 56 The court concluded that the state presented no
compelling reason for the distinctions between economic and
57
non-economic damages, and struck down the statute.
Analysis in Pfost v. State, in which the court held that
article II, section 16 creates a fundamental right, bolstered this
view. 58
This case presented a challenge to a statutory
distinction between damages caused by the state and other
damages. Once it determined that the provision affected a
fundamental right, the court concluded that the statute violated
the intent of the Constitutional Convention to protect the rights
of individuals. 59 Finding no compelling state interest justifying
distinctions in the statute, the court found the statute

unconstitutional under section

16.60

For the next fifteen years, the court periodically
reconsidered the status of section 16 vis-a-vis a fundamental
rights analysis. 61 In the landmark case of Meech v. Hillhaven
West, Inc.,62 the court reexamined the "fundamental rights"
aspect of section 16 yet again. In evaluating whether the
Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, which provides
exclusive remedies and limits the type of damages claims
available, deprives a litigant of a right to full legal redress, the
court said section 16 does not guarantee a fundamental right to

54. Id. 203 Mont. at 367-68, 661 P.2d at 1274-75.
55. Id., 203 Mont. at 368-69, 661 P.2d at 1275.
56. Id., 203 Mont. at 369, 661 P.2d at 1275
57. Id.
58. Pfost v. State, 219 Mont. 206, 219, 713 P.2d 495, 503 (1985), overruled by 238
Mont. 21, 776 P.2d 488 (1989).
59. Id., 219 Mont. at 221-22, 713 P.2d at 504-05. See also Burke, supra note 26, at
77.
60. Id., 219 Mont. at 222-23, 713 P.2d at 505.
61.
See, e.g., Peterson v. Great Falls Sch. Dist. No. 1 and A, 237 Mont. 376, 380,
773 P.2d 316, 318 (1989) (holding that access to the courts is not a fundamental right,
thus the constitutionality of the statute is presumed and the State need only show the
action is rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
62. 238 Mont. 21, 776 P.2d 488 (1989). A central issue in Meech was separation of
powers, and the legislature's ability to alter or restrict common law remedies for injuries
to person, property, or character. Ultimately, the court concluded that court interference
with the right of the legislature to change the common law would violate the
Constitutional separation of powers doctrine. Id., 238 Mont. at 42, 776 P.2d at 501.
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any particularcause of action or full legal redress. 63 Noting that
section 16 is directed at the courts, the court found that the
legislature could alter common law causes of action. 64 Justice
McDonough, writing for the court, stated as follows:
In conclusion, Montana's remedy clause seeks to guarantee equal
access to courts to obtain remedies for injuries as provided by
governing law. It does not, however, impart a definition of what
the law considers a remedy or full legal redress. Nor does it
empower this Court to exclude the legislature from defining what
are legal injuries. Finally, we make clear here that the proper test
burdening one class and not
to apply to the Act's classifications
65
another, is the rational basis test.

In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Sheehy began: "This is the
blackest judicial day in the eleven years that I have sat on this
Court . . . the Court throws in the sponge as a co-equal in our
tripartite state government." 66 Justice Sheehy continued:
As surely as there are fundamental rights, there are surely no
fundamental half-rights. The right of access to courts is only part
of the fundamental right; the right to a full legal remedy
completes the part to make a whole. The two, access to the courts
and full redress, indivisibly make one fundamental right, and
together they are the essence of justice. They must coexist to
complete the fundamental right to justice .... When, however,
the legislature acts invidiously to discriminate between persons
this Court to
similarly situated, Art. II, § 16 imposes a duty upon
67
make certain that right and justice are not denied.

In his dissent, Justice Sheehy concluded that the Wrongful
Discharge From Employment Act violated the equal protection
clause of the state constitution, finding that it did not serve a
legitimate governmental purpose, had no rational basis, and
could not support a balancing test between the rights of
68
employers and employees to life's basic necessities.

ii. Section 16protects rights without which other rights
would have no meaning.
The Meech decision

fundamental

right

was

that

section

affirmed

in

16

does not create

subsequent

a

Montana

63. Id., 238 Mont. at 36, 776 P.2d at 497.
64. Id., 238 Mont. at 34, 776 P.2d at 496.
65. Id., 238 Mont. at 52, 776 P.2d at 507.
66. Id., 238 Mont. at 52, 776 P.2d at 507 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
67. Meech, 238 Mont. at 64, 65, 776 P.2d at 514, 515 (emphasis in original)
(Sheehy, J., dissenting).
68. Id., 238 Mont. at 67, 776 P.2d at 516 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court decisions. 69 The state of the law remained
generally unchanged until 2002, when the link between section
16 and fundamental rights again resurfaced. 70 In Koss v.
Jones, an investor's action against a securities broker for alleged
violations of securities law, negligence, breach of fiduciary
The case
obligations, and fraud, addressed this issue. 7 1
concerned a mandatory arbitration agreement and its
enforcement against the appellant, an elderly widow. Justice
Trieweiler, writing for the majority, concluded that the
arbitration agreements were in contracts of adhesion, and
therefore unenforceable, and held that Respondent had a
fiduciary duty to explain the arbitration agreements to the
72
appellant.
In a specially concurring opinion, Justice Nelson, joined by
the majority of the court, addressed the appellant's rights of
access to the courts and to a jury trial. He affirmed prior
decisions that article II rights are fundamental rights, which
"means that these rights are significant components of liberty..
• any infringement of which will trigger the highest level of
scrutiny, and thus, the highest level of protection by the
courts." 73 He characterized the right of access to the courts in
article II, section 16 as follows:
In my view, this right is as much a fundamental right as is any
other article II right. This is so not only because the right of
access to the courts is included within the Constitution's
Declaration of Rights, but also, and just as importantly, without
the right of access to the courts, other article II rights would have
little protection from infringement and, thus, little meaning....
Purely and simply, access to the courts guarantees that other
Article II rights are something more than mere dreams and
aspirations. Access to the courts gives real existence to other
fundamental rights. And, that makes access to the courts a
right also, for without this right other rights have no
fundamental
74
meaning.

69. See, e.g., Miller v. Fallon County, 240 Mont. 241, 248, 783 P.2d 419, 424 (1989)
(reaffirming its holdings in Peterson and Meech that access to the courts and full legal
redress are not fundamental rights).

70.

Id. 7 6-7.

71.

Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 2002 MT 129, 310 Mont. 123, 54 P.3d 1, cert.

denied, 538 U.S. 956 (2003).
72. Id. 77 28, 38.
73.
74.

Id. T 52 (Nelson, J., concurring).
Id. 77 57-58 (Nelson, J., concurring).
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Finally, Justice Nelson writes:
In short, without access to the courts, there is no way to safeguard
the other fundamental rights guaranteed by article II of
Montana's Constitution. Indeed, to the extent that those rights
cannot be protected by the courts, Montana's Declaration of Rights
is little more than a collection of eloquent, but unenforceable
words. Access to the courts is a fundamental
right, and our cases
75
that hold to the contrary are wrong.

Although a concurrence, Justice Nelson's opinion was joined by
76
the majority of the court, and therefore has precedential value.
The court has not explicitly addressed the "fundamental right"
nature of section 16 since the Koss decision in 2002.
Despite the convoluted interpretive history of section 16, it
is now clear this provision creates fundamental rights.7 7 For the
purposes of this discussion, one must then ask if a litigant can
secure meaningful access to the courts absent counsel. Although
there is limited research addressing this issue, it is apparent
that, at least in certain situations, access without counsel is
meaningless, and therefore counsel is required by section 16.78
In a similar approach adopted prior to Koss, the court
developed a "necessary incident" test for determining
fundamental rights.7 9 In Wadsworth v. State,80 the plaintiffs

75. Id.
63 (Nelson, J., concurring).
76. Ordinarily, a concurrence has no precedential value and is not binding upon
the court. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 141 (2004). However, "the views expressed in a separate
concurring opinion of an individual judge are those of the court and a controlling

authority, only where a majority of the court concur therein." Id. (emphasis added). See
also Longon Guarantee & Accident Co. v. McCoy, 45 P.2d 900, 902 (Colo. 1935) (noting
that a concurring opinion joined by five other members of the court "became, equally
with the other, the opinion of the court."); Anderson v. Sutton, 293 S.W. 770, 773 (Mo.
1927) (noting "[v]iews expressed in a separate concurring opinion of an individual judge
are not the views of the court, unless it appears that the majority of the court concurred
in such separately expressed views."); and Alabama v. Goldstein, 93 So. 308, 314 (Ala.
1922) (stating "it has well been said that the views of the individual judges are of no
concern unless such views are adopted by at least a majority of the court.").
77. Kloss, 63.
78. The little research that does exist suggests that this assistance is more
valuable for some litigants than others, and more useful for addressing certain kinds of
problems than others. See, e.g., Michael Millemann, Natalie Gilfrich & Richard Granat,

Rethinking the Full-Service Representation Model: A Maryland Experiment, 30
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1178 (1997) (describing a clinical course at the University of
Maryland School of Law in which students provided legal information and advice to pro
se litigants at the courthouse. The participants concluded that the clients' ability to
proceed pro se after receiving the assistance depended on factors such as self-motivation,
writing skills, and intelligence. Additionally, clients were most satisfied when their
cases required mechanical justice compared to when their cases required "substantial
legal judgment and discretion.").
79. Id., 275 Mont. at 298, 911 P.2d at 1171.
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challenged an informal agency decision precluding employees
from having outside employment. 8 ' The Appellant argued that
article II, section 3 of the constitution, which provides that
Montanans shall have an inalienable right to pursue life's basic
necessities, necessarily included an opportunity to earn a
living.8 2 After reasserting that section 3 created fundamental
rights, the court continued:
We conclude that without the right to the opportunity to pursue
employment, the right to pursue life's basic necessities would have
little meaning, because it is primarily through work and
employment that one exercises and enjoys this latter fundamental
83
constitutional right.

The court concluded that "the right to the opportunity to pursue
of the
employment generally as a necessary incident
84
necessities."
basic
life's
pursue
to
right
fundamental
After determining the right to pursue employment a
"necessary incident" to a fundamental right, the court applied a
strict scrutiny analysis. It stated that the agency must show a
compelling state interest for its restriction and the applicable
classification must be "closely tailored to effectuate only that
compelling state interest. 8' 5 The state must also show that its
"choice of legislative action is the least onerous path that can be
taken to achieve the state objective."8 6 Ultimately, the court
found that the record submitted by the agency failed to show a
found the regulation
interest, and
compelling state
87
unconstitutional.
The right to counsel is a right without which other
fundamental rights have little meaning. Just as employment is
a "necessary incident" of the right to pursue life's basic
necessities, so, too, is the right to counsel a "necessary incident"
of access to the courts, another fundamental right. Other rights
80. 275 Mont. 287, 911 P.2d 1165 (1996).
81. Id.
82. Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at 302, 911 P.2d at 1173-74.
83. Id., 275 Mont. at 299, 911 P.2d at 1172.
84. Id. 275 Mont. at 301, 911 P.2d at 1173 (emphasis added). The court
distinguished this right from a right or property interest in any particular job or
employment. Id.
85. Id., 275 Mont. at 302, 911 P.2d at 1174.
86. Id.
87. Id., 275 Mont. at 303, 911 P.2d at 1174. While the agency alleged a compelling
state interest, the court noted the record indicated that the agency was concerned about
an appearance of impropriety, but could not substantiate any allegations of impropriety
nor any detrimental affect on the agency due to appraisers' outside employment. Id., 275
Mont. at 303-04, 911 P.2d at 1174-75.
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are "rendered meaningless absent the courts being able to
enforce these rights. Purely and simply, access to the courts
guarantees that other Article II rights are something more than
mere dreams and aspirations."8 8 In fact, this is precisely the
role filled by a right to counsel; it ensures that the other rights
protected in the constitution have meaning.
b. Section 16 creates benefits "lodged in the Constitution."
An alternative approach to analyzing section 16 is as a
"benefit lodged in our state constitution."8 9 In a case challenging
the state's efforts to reduce general assistance payments to poor
people under fifty years of age, Appellants relied on article XII,
section 3(3) and article II, section 4 of the Montana
Constitution. 90 The court noted that welfare was important
enough to merit mention in the constitution, and therefore any
legislation that limited the availability of welfare should be
subjected to a heightened scrutiny analysis. 91 The court stated
that welfare is a "benefit lodged in our State Constitution [and
therefore] is an interest whose abridgement requires something
92
more than a rational relationship to a governmental objective."
The court also stated that "[w]here constitutionally significant
interests are implicated by governmental classification,
arbitrary lines should be condemned. Further, there should be
balancing of the rights infringed and the governmental interest
to be served by such infringement." 93 Butte outlined a two part
test: 1) whether the classification is reasonable; and 2) whether
the state's interest in classifying is more important than the
94
peoples' interest in obtaining benefits.
After finding that governmental benefits deserve more
protection than that afforded under a rational basis test, the
court balanced "the rights infringed and the government's

88. Kloss, 58 (Nelson, J., concurring).
89. Butte Cmty. Union, 219 Mont. at 434, 712 P.2d at 1313.
90. Id. At that time, article XII, section 3(3) provided that "[tihe legislature shall
provide such economic assistance and social and rehabilitative services as may be
necessary for those inhabitants who, by reason of age, infirmities and misfortune may
have need for the aid of society." Article II, section 4 is Montana's dignity clause and
equal protection provision, discussed above. MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3(3) (amended
1988).
91. Butte, 219 Mont. at 434, 712 P.2d at 1313.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Id., 219 Mont. at 434, 712 P.2d at 1314.
94. Id.
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interest to be served by such infringement." 95
The court
determined that the state failed to show that those under age
fifty were more capable of surviving without money than those
above age fifty, and that the state's interest in saving money
needed to be balanced against the interests of those in need of
the money. 96 Using this equal protection analysis and a newlydeveloped "middle tier" approach, the court determined that the
legislation violated the state's equal protection clause. 97 The
Montana middle-tier test applies to rights found in the
constitution, even if not "fundamental rights," and requires a
balancing of the state's interest and the individual's interest at
stake.
Significantly, the Butte decision expanded development of
Montana's equal protection jurisprudence, creating a new
construct for analyses of equal protection issues. Notably, the
court acknowledged the approach adopted by the United States
Supreme Court, and stated, "[w]e will not be bound by decisions
of the United States Supreme Court where independent state
grounds exist for developing heightened and expanded rights
98
under our state constitution."
When applied to the right to counsel issue, the "benefit
lodged in the constitution" analysis is helpful, but does not go
far enough to result in the appointment of counsel. One can
argue that the right to counsel, like the right to employment, is
a "benefit lodged" in article 16. However, this analogy would
result in a middle-tier analysis, requiring a balancing of the
interests of the individual in need of counsel against the
interests of the state. A balancing of these interests could result
in the appointment of counsel in the most egregious
circumstances, but certainly not in all, or even most, civil
cases. 99 Thus, this argument is of limited usefulness in creating
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Butte Cmty. Union ,219 Mont. at 434-35, 712 P.2d at 1314. In the wake of this
decision, the Montana Constitution was amended to make the provision of benefits
discretionary. The new language provides as follows: 'The legislature may provide such
economic assistance and social and rehabilitative services for those who, by reason of
age, infirmities, or misfortune, are determined by the legislature to be in need." Mont.
Const., art. XII, § 3(3) (emphasis added).
98. Butte, 219 Mont. at 433, 712 P.2d at 1313. See also State v. Guillaume, 1999
MT 29, 13, 293 Mont. 224,
13, 975 P.2d 312, 13 (holding that the double jeopardy
clause in the Montana Constitution provides more protection to defendants than the
similar clause in the U.S. Constitution).
99. See Section II(C)(1) infra for a discussion of a balancing of interests under a
due process analysis.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2005

19

100

LAW
REVIEW
Montana MONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
66 [2005],
Iss. 1, Art. 5

Vol. 66

a civil Gideon.
c. Section 16 Requires Meaningful Access to the Courts in All
Cases Involving a FundamentalRight
An alternative approach to developing a civil Gideon under
the Montana Constitution is to apply section 16 in conjunction
The court has deemed
with other fundamental rights.
fundamental a variety of rights in the Montana Constitution.
An alternative right to counsel argument, contends those other
fundamental rights create a liberty interest that implicates due
process, and the right to counsel is necessary to protect that
interest. Section III analyzes the fundamental right to parent
as an example of one such right, and why indigent litigants
should be granted counsel when their right to parent is at stake.
B. The Dignity Clause
Article II, section 4 of the Montana Constitution provides as
follows:
INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY. The dignity of the human being is
inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or
institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of
his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture,
social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.

Montana's dignity clause, one of many clauses in the
Montana Constitution with no counterpart in federal law,10 0 is
See Ellison & Snyder, supra, note 6 (noting that seventeen of the rights
100.
articulated in the Montana Constitution have no federal counterpart). Although there is
no dignity clause in the United States Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has
acknowledged the concept of dignity in some of its seminal decisions. See, e.g., Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (noting that the laws and traditions of this country
have afforded constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education, the Court
said, "[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 26465 (1970) (ruling that welfare recipients have a due process right to a pretermination
evidentiary hearing, the Court said, "[firom its founding the Nation's basic commitment
has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders."). For
further discussion of the role of dignity in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, see, e.g.,
Vicki C. Jackson, ConstitutionalDialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational
Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15, 15 (2004) (describing "the role of the
concept of 'human dignity' in the court's jurisprudence as episodic and underdeveloped");
Mathew 0. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the
Montana Constitution's "Dignity" Clause with Possible Applications, 61 MONT. L. REV.
301, 312 (2000) (describing "ordinary uses" of the dignity concept in U.S. Supreme Court
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useful in formulating a "civil Gideon." Although it lay dormant
for many years, scholars and the courts are applying this
provision with increasing frequency. This section discusses two
primary approaches to utilizing Montana's dignity clause: as a
complementary right and as an independent right. 10 1 It also
reviews current Montana Supreme Court jurisprudence in this
area, laying the foundation for right to counsel arguments.
Finally, this section concludes by arguing why the dignity
clause, in conjunction with other state constitutional rights,
supports a civil right to counsel.
1. Dignity as a Complementary Right
Mathew Clifford and Professor Thomas Huff propose an
analytical framework for interpreting Montana's dignity
clause, 10 2 a framework that ultimately supports a civil Gideon in
certain contexts. They provide an extensive analysis of the
clause's origin, and place it in the historical context of
seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-century political
philosophers. Clifford and Huff note that many of the leading
thinkers of that era "each, in his own way, justified the modern
liberal state by appealing to the significance of individuals and
the importance of respect for their choices or preferences.' 0 3
One interpretation of the dignity clause recommended by
the authors is as a "complementary" right. 10 4 They describe this
approach as follows:
[T]he dignity right can inform, reciprocally, the meaning and force
of some of the other, especially the more abstract, rights of the
Declaration of Rights, like the equal protection or the privacy
rights. Operating in this way, the application of the dignity right
can play a mutually complementary role, supporting or being

jurisprudence).
101.
Clifford & Huff, supra note 100, at 328 (outlining these two approaches to
interpreting Montana's constitutional right to dignity).
102. Id. at 302.
103. Id. at 311.
104. Id. at 325-26. Noted scholar Heinz Kug also has suggested various approaches
for interpreting Montana's dignity clause. Heinz Kug, The Dignity Clause of the
Montana Constitution: May Foreign Jurisprudence Lead the Way to an Expanded
Interpretation?,64 MONT. L. REV. 133 (2003). Professor Klug concludes by encouraging
the Montana courts to "mine foreign dignity jurisprudence to define the content and
scope of its own clause." Id. at 155. See also James Dallner & D. Scott Manning, Death
with Dignity in Montana, 65 MONT. L. REV. 309, 335 (2004) (analyzing whether
Montana's dignity clause supports a right to die with dignity, the authors suggest three
conceptualizations of Montana's dignity clause: 1) dignity as individual; 2) dignity as
related to equal protection; and 3) dignity as inviolable).
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Similarities exist between interpretations of Montana's dignity
clause and those of other nations. Although South Africa's
dignity clause has been described as the "cornerstone" of its
constitution, 0 6 it also has been interpreted in a complementary
fashion. Four of the five references to dignity in the South
African constitution appear in the Bill of Rights. 10 7 The last of
these addresses dignity as "a factor for the courts to consider in
deciding whether a limitation of a right is reasonable and
justifiable."' 0 8
Initially described by the South African
Constitutional Court as a "value-a foundational norn which
pervades the interpretation of other rights and the Constitution
as a whole," increasingly South Africa's dignity clause can be
seen as a right "considered in conjunction with the violation of
other rights."'0 9
The German Constitution's dignity clause states: "The
dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect, and protect it,

shall be the duty of all state authority."" 0 This section of the
German Constitution cannot be amended, resulting in dignity
being described as "the crown value" in the German
Constitution."'
Also described as having a "symbiotic"

105. Clifford & Huff, supra note 100, at 325-26. Equally significant to Clifford and
Huff's proposed interpretations are the limitations they suggest. They conclude that
violations of the dignity clause must be "significant enough to assault the core humanity
of persons by degrading, demeaning, debasing or trivializing their worth as human
beings." Id. at 326. Their second limitation is that "the substantive meaning of the
clause must not be identified with, or justified by, any specific controversial religious or
philosophical doctrines." Id. See also Snetsinger v. Montana University System, 2004
MT 390,
65, 325 Mont. 148, 65, 104 P.3d 445, 65 (Nelson, J., concurring) (noting
that, historically, the dignity clause has been applied mostly to reinforce other rights).
106. Heather Schooling, Note, The Notion of 'Dignity' in South African Equality
Jurisprudence,RESPONSA MERIDIANA 2 (1999) (quoting National Coalition For Gay and
Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at [28]).
107. Klug, supra note 104, at 148.
108. Id.
109. Schooling, supra note 106, at 2-3 (describing the role of dignity in evolving
equality jurisprudence in South Africa, in particular the court's emphasis on the
protection of human dignity as a goal of the constitution's anti-discrimination
provisions).
110. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1, § 1 (F.R.G.), reprinted in DONALD
KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 298 (2nd ed. 1997).
111. Luis Anibal Aviles Pagan, Human Dignity, Privacy and Personality Rights In
the ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof Germany, the United States and the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 343, 348 (1998) (stating that the German
constitutional order is fundamentally based on a hierarchy of values, which human
dignity "crowns").
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relationship with other rights in the German Constitution, this
section serves as either an "optical lens," which the court uses to
scrutinize other rights, or as a "counterweight," for balancing
conflicting rights. 112 Again, typically, the clause is used in
conjunction with other rights established in the constitution.
Finally, Montana borrowed its dignity clause verbatim from
the 1952 Puerto Rican Constitution.1 1 3 Located in the Puerto
Rican Constitution's Bill of Rights, that country's dignity clause
reflects its colonial history and its desire for equality. 114 In all of
these examples, courts interpreting the dignity provisions do so
most frequently when interpreting other basic constitutional
15
rights.1
2. Dignity as an Independent Right
Montana's dignity clause also can be viewed as an
independent right. Clifford and Huff suggest the clause should
provide "protections against treatment which degrades the
worth of individual persons, treatment that is not otherwise
protected by the more specific provisions of the Declaration of
Rights."11 6 They write, "[t]he dignity right, when applied in this
independent form, fills the gaps between the other norms which
also protect our dignity."1 17 The protection of the disabled or
mentally ill from degrading treatment is an example of this use
of the dignity clause.1 18 This approach is consistent with that of
Professor Klug, who suggests that dignity can be treated as an
independent,
constitutionally
protected
right "with a

112. Id. at 351. See also Jackson, supra note 100, at 25 (referring to Germany's
dignity clause as expressing "'the highest value of the Basic Law, informing the
substance and spirit of the entire document."' (internal citation omitted)).
113. Pagan, supra note 111, at 367 (citing P.R. Const. art II., § 1); Snetsinger, 64
(Nelson, J., concurring). For an interesting discussion of the origins of Puerto Rico's
clause, see Jackson, supra note 100, at 23-24 (noting that drafters of the Puerto Rican
constitution deliberately sought to draw on international norms, such as the
International Declaration of Human Rights, wanting to incorporate different cultures'
views on categories of rights).
114. Pagan, supra note 111, at 369. Like Montana's Constitution, the Puerto Rican
Constitution has an explicit right to privacy, which has been interpreted in light of its
dignity clause. Id. In most cases involving the right to privacy, the Puerto Rican courts
stress the importance of human dignity and then decide the case without addressing the
privacy interests involved in the specific facts. Id. at 372.
115. Id. at 372.
116. Clifford & Huff, supra note 100, at 325.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 331. In this context, the dignity right should afford disabled people basic
human needs and the opportunity to develop and grow personally. Id.
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substantive content distinct from other individual or collective
rights." 119
3. Montana Supreme Court's "Dignity"Jurisprudence
The Montana Constitution's dignity and equal protection
clauses are in the same section, article II, section 4. Initially,
the dignity clause served simply as an adjunct to equal
120
protection, another explicit article II, section 4 right.
Although the court's reliance on the dignity clause began in this
peripheral way, its use and view of the clause has expanded in
recent years. An overview of the court's equal protection
jurisprudence
is
helpful
to
understanding
evolving
interpretations of the dignity clause.
Montana has adopted three levels of equal protection
scrutiny which are similar to, yet different from, federal equal
protection doctrine. 12' Under Montana's rational basis test, a
standard nearly identical to that developed in the federal
jurisprudence, a classification must be "reasonable, not
arbitrary, and it must bear a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly situated
can be treated alike.' 1 22 Examples of classifications upheld
under a rational basis standard include a distinction precluding
a tribal employee from being eligible for workers compensation
since the state could not compel the tribe to participate in its
workers compensation program and substitute benefits were
available under the statute, 23 tax classifications that exclude
119. Mug, supranote 104, at 145.
120. See, e.g., Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Serv., 229 Mont. 40, 42-43, 744 P.2d 895,
897 (1987) (citing both the dignity and equal protection clauses, the court stated that
Montana's constitution affords greater protections than the federal counterpart;
however, the court limited its analysis to equal protection arguments); Davis v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 282 Mont. 233, 240-41, 937 P.2d 27, 31 (1997) (stating the principal
purpose of article II, section 4 is to ensure that citizens are not subject to arbitrary and
discriminatory state action. The court cites the dignity clause as part of the article II,
section 4, but does not analyze it separately from the equal protection clause).
121. See, e.g., Snetsinger,
17-19, 27, 37 (after outlining the three levels of
scrutiny, the court held, in a 4-3 decision, that the University System's policy of denying
benefits to unmarried same sex partners while offering benefits to unmarried opposite
sex partners was not rationally related to a legitimate government objective); McKamey
v. State, 268 Mont. 137, 145-47, 885 P.2d 515, 521-22 (1994) (outlining the three levels of
scrutiny).
122. Powder River County v. State, 2002 MT 259, 79, 312 Mont. 198, 79, 60 P.3d
357, 79 (applying a rational basis standard, the court determined that the exclusion of
coal, oil and natural gas from statutory tax classifications, when combined with taxation
in other provisions, did not violate equal protection).
123. Zempel v. Uninsured Employer's Fund, 282 Mont. 424, 938 P. 2d 27 (1997).
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extractive materials from a statutory classification, 1 24 and a
distinction in the workers' compensation law between coverage
for mental stress injury and coverage for physical stress
injury. 125
The court found no rational basis for a state
university policy denying benefits to unmarried same sex
partners while granting them to unmarried opposite sex
partners, 126 venue rules that provided different rules for those
litigants with claims against out-of-state corporations, 1 27 and for
distinctions between those workers with work-related injuries
and those with work-related diseases for the purposes of
receiving workers' compensation benefits. 128 The court also
applied a rational basis test to a workers' compensation
provision providing that claimants covered by certain insurers
could choose their physicians and those covered by other
insurers could not. 129 The court concluded that "cost-control
alone cannot justify disparate treatment that violates an
130
individual's right to equal protection of the law.'
Montana's "strict scrutiny" analysis also mirrors that of
federal law. This approach applies to fundamental rights,
defined as those rights that are in the Montana Declaration of
Rights or those rights without which other fundamental rights
This standard has been held
would not have meaning.' 3 '
132
applicable to restrictions on private work by state employees
124. Powder River,
79 (stating that "if classification is neither capricious nor
arbitrary, and rests upon real differences and some reasonable consideration of
difference or policy, there is no denial of the equal protection of the law").
125. Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County, 259 Mont. 147, 153-55, 855 P.2d 506, 510-11
(1993).
126. Snetsinger, 27.
127. Davis v. Union Pac. R.R., 282 Mont. 233, 937 P.2d 27 (1997). The court in
Davis applied a rational basis test. Id., 282 Mont. at 242, 937 P.2d at 32. However,
Justice Trieweiler filed a concurrence advocating the application of a strict scrutiny
standard given that venue implicates Montana Constitution article II, section 16, the
fundamental rights provision. Id., 282 Mont. at 249, 937 P.2d at 36 (Trieweiler, J.,
concurring).
38, 294 Mont. 449, 38, 982
128. Henry v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 1999 MT 126,
P.2d 456, 38.
129. Heisler v. Hines Motor Co., 282 Mont. 270, 284-85, 937 P.2d 45, 53 (1997).
130. Id., 282 Mont. at 283, 937 P.2d at 52.
131. See Butte, 219 Mont. at 430, 712 P.2d at 1311.
132. Wadsworth v. State, 275 Mont. 287, 911 P.2d 1165 (1996) (holding that
restrictions prohibiting a state appraiser from engaging in outside employment
interfered with his right to work). In Wadsworth, the court held that article II, section 3
of the Montana Constitution, which provides a right to pursue life's basic necessities,
includes the right to work, since work is a right 'without which other constitutionally
guaranteed rights would have little meaning, and therefore the restriction is subject to
strict scrutiny."' Id., 275 Mont. at 299, 911 P.2d at 1172 (citing Butte, 219 Mont. at 430,
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and regulations affecting industry and their impact on the
133
environment.
Montana law diverges from the federal equal protection
approach in the middle standard of review. Montana's standard
was developed in the seminal case of Butte Community Union v.
Lewis, 134 as discussed above. Analyzing the two relevant factors:
1) whether the classification is reasonable; and 2) whether the
government's interest in the classification is more important
than the people's interest in receiving the benefit. 135 The court
concluded that the state failed to show that this legislation
restricting welfare benefits was other than arbitrary, and that
the state's interest in saving money through implementation of
this restriction must be balanced against the needs of those
receiving the benefit. 136 In this case, the record failed to
13 7
demonstrate the state's dire need of the financial resources.
4. Application of Montana's Dignity Approaches
This background assists in examining how the Montana
Supreme Court has relied on the dignity clause. Clifford and
Huff argue convincingly that standard tools of interpretation as
well as constitutional convention history demonstrate that the
constitution's framers intended these phrases to have distinct
meaning. 138 Despite the court's independent use of the dignity
712 P.2d at 1311). Therefore, the court subjected the restriction to strict scrutiny
analysis. Id., 275 Mont. at 303, 911 P.2d at 1174.
133. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 1999 MT 248, T 63, 296 Mont.
207,
63, 988 P2d. 1236, T 63 (holding that the right to a clean and healthful
environment, as provided in article II, section 3 of the constitution, is a fundamental
right because it is guaranteed by the declaration of rights, and therefore requires the
application of strict scrutiny). See also Snetsinger, TT 97-98 (Nelson, J., concurring)
(concluding that distinctions based on sexual orientation are sex-based, and therefore
subject to strict scrutiny equal protection analysis).
134. 219 Mont. at 433, 712 P.2d at 1313-14.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. In 1988, following the Butte Cmty. Union decision, article XII, section 3(3) of
the Montana Constitution was amended. The new language reads as follows: "The
legislature may provide such economic assistance and social and rehabilitative services
for those who, by reason of age, infirmities, or misfortune are determined by the
legislature to be in need." MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3(3).
138. Clifford & Huff, supra note 100, at 303. The authors argue that the language
of the dignity clause moves logically in a progression from the general to the specific and
each of the three clauses must be viewed "as both substantively meaningful and not
redundant." Id. at 305. The inclusion of the broad prohibition against violation of
human dignity "leaves open the possibility that human dignity can be violated in ways
that do not involve some arbitrary classification;" thus, the dignity clause must refer to
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clause in recent years, most often the court has invoked the
139
dignity clause in conjunction with other fundamental rights.
Dignity has played a complementary role with rights such as
cruel and unusual
due process, 140 the right to be free from
142
punishment,1 4 1 and the right to privacy.
In In the Matter of KG.F., the court analyzed the right to
counsel afforded mentally ill people facing involuntary civil
commitment proceedings. 143 After finding that such patients
have a right to effective assistance of counsel, the court
articulated a standard for measuring effectiveness. Rejecting
144
the criminal standard established in Strickland v. Washington
as insufficient to protect the liberty interests of the mentally ill,
the court turned to Montana law, relying on section 17 of the
Montana Constitution (the due process clause), section 53-21101(1) of the Montana Code Annotated, and the constitution's
dignity clause.
The relevant statute provides that patients who may be
involuntarily committed must be afforded care and treatment
that is "skillfully and humanely administered with full respect
for the person's dignity and personal integrity." 145 The court
noted the specific protections afforded in the statute to preserve
the patients' dignity.146 Characterizing the dignity right as a
fundamental right present throughout the civil commitment
process, the court stated, "[t]hus, we agree that the [sic] 'quality
counsel provides the most likely way-perhaps the only likely
way-to ensure the due process protections of dignity and
privacy interests in cases such as the one at bar."1 47 The court
essentially analyzes dignity and privacy as liberty interests
l4 8
protected by the due process clause.
human dignity on a level "beyond that protected by the equal protection and nondiscrimination clauses." Id. at 307.
139. Clifford & Huff, supranote 100, at 328.
140. In re K.G.F., 2001 MT 140, 1 91, 306 Mont 1, 91, 29 P.3d 485, 91.
141. Walker v. State, 2003 MT 134, 81, 316 Mont. 103, 81, 68 P. 3d. 872, 81.
142. Armstrong, 1999 MT 261, 72, 296 Mont. 361, 72, 989 P.2d 364, 72.
143. K.G.F., 1.
144. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring litigants alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel in the criminal context to demonstrate that 1) counsel acted outside the range of
competence and 2) but for counsel's incompetence, the result would have been different).
145.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-101(1) (2003).

146.

K.G.F., 77 44-46.

147. KG.F., 48 (emphasis in original) (citing Michael L. Perlin, FatalAssumption:
A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM
BEHAV. 39, 47 (1992)).

148.

See id. but cf. Elaine Dahl, Note, Taking Liberties: Analysis of In Re Mental

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2005

27

108

MONTANA
LAW
REVIEW
Montana Law
Review, Vol.
66 [2005],
Iss. 1, Art. 5

Vol. 66

Another recent interpretation of the dignity clause arose in
a case alleging cruel and unusual punishment. 149 After
recounting the conditions which the appellant, Walker,
experienced while at Montana State Prison, the court noted the
expert's testimony that the mentally ill Appellant was given no
medication or other treatment and the Behavior Modification
Plans ("BMPs") imposed on him were "counter-therapeutic,
punitive and cruel."'150
In addressing Walker's cruel and unusual punishment
claims under both the United States Constitution and article II,
section 22 of the Montana Constitution, the Walker court
reviewed applicable law on treatment of prisoners, especially
those in administrative segregation, and examined allegations of
excessive use of force.
Significantly, it noted cases that
reference the dignity of the prisoner. The court wrote:
Just as we read the privacy provision of the Montana Constitution
in conjunction with the provisions regarding search and seizure to
provide Montanans with greater protections from government
intrusion, so too do we read the dignity provision of the Montana
Constitution together with article II, section 22 to provide
Montana citizens greater protections from cruel
and unusual
51
punishment than does the federal constitution.1
Given their place in the Declaration of Rights, these rights
become fundamental and require strict scrutiny. 152 Holding that
the conditions which Walker experienced constituted both cruel
and unusual punishment under article II, section 22 of the
Montana Constitution and a violation of the state's dignity
clause, the court stated, "[t]he plain meaning of the dignity
clause commands that the intrinsic worth and the basic
humanity of persons may not be violated."'153 The Walker case
provides another example of the court's willingness to find
violations of the dignity clause in conjunction with other
fundamental rights violations.
Health of K.G.F., 64 MoNT. L. REV. 295 (2003) (arguing, inter alia, that the court need
not have considered the privacy and dignity issues in this case, given the physical liberty
issues at stake in a civil commitment proceeding).

149.
150.
151.
152.

Walker, 1.
Id. 66.
Id. 1 73.
Id. 74.

153. Id.
82. But see id.
86-101 (Gray, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the case is
now moot and criticizing the majority for failing to thoroughly research the source of
Montana's dignity clause). See also Clifford & Huff, supra note 100, at 318, arguing that
the 1972 constitutional convention history demonstrates that dignity is a concept
independent of other fundamental liberties and anti-discrimination provisions.
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The court reached a similar conclusion in a challenge to
Montana's statute prohibiting abortions performed by physician
assistants and second trimester abortions performed outside of a
hospital. 154 Although the court based its decision largely on the
constitutional right to privacy, the court did note that:
Respect for the dignity of each individual ...demands that people
have for themselves the moral right and moral responsibility to
confront the most fundamental questions about the meaning and
value of their own lives and the intrinsic value of life in general,
155
answering to their own consciences and convictions.

While the reference to the dignity clause in the Armstrong
opinion may well be dicta, the opinion offers an example of the
court's interest in developing a "dignity jurisprudence," applying
156
the clause in conjunction with other fundamental rights.
The court should adopt a similar approach in the civil
Gideon context as that adopted in the K.G.F., Walker, and
Armstrong decisions. In each of those cases, the dignity clause's
application to another fundamental right resulted in a violation
of the inviolable right to dignity. In the civil Gideon context, the
dignity clause can be utilized in conjunction with the
administration of justice clause, which creates other
fundamental rights.
The dignity clause also works in
conjunction with the administration of justice clause and the
fundamental right to parent together, with all three rights
working to create a limited right to counsel. 157

154. Armstrong, 1999 MT 261, 296 Mont. 361, 989 P2d. 364.
155. Id.
72. But see id. 78 (Gray, C. J., specially concurring) ("I am troubled by
that portion of the court's opinion which states-without any analysis whatsoever-that
the rights of personal and procreative autonomy at issue in this case also find protection
in the individual dignity and equal protections rights set forth in Article II, Section 4.
That discussion is far beyond the scope of the case as presented and, in any event, is
totally unsupported by the court." ).
156. For additional discussions by the court on the dignity clause, see, e.g., In re
Custody of J.C.O., 1999 MT 325, 16, 297 Mont. 327, 16, 993 P.2d 667, 16 (Nelson,
J., specially concurring) (arguing the dignity provision "clearly ... guarantees that a
mother has as much right to have her child bear her surname as does a father and that a
child has as much right to bear its mother's surname as it does its father's"); In Re
Marriage of Davies, 266 Mont. 466, 481, 880 P.2d 1368, 1378 (1994) (Nelson, J.,
concurring) (arguing there is no basis for gender discrimination in any legal proceeding
within the state, since every attorney and judge has sworn to uphold the Montana
Constitution, including the right of individual dignity).
157. Other industrial democracies have granted the right to counsel for indigent
litigants in all civil cases based on access to the courts. See, e.g., Justice Earl Johnson,

Jr., Equal Access: Will Gideon's Trumpet Sounds a New Melody: The Globalizationof the
Constitutional Values and its Implications for a Right to Equal Justice in Civil Cases, 2
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 201, 202 (2003) [hereinafter, Globalization] (noting that the
European Court of Human Rights (European Court) concluded that the "European
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A recent concurring opinion takes Montana's dignity clause
one step further, and interprets it as an independent right. 158 In
analyzing the state university system's policy denying benefits
to same-sex partners, Justice Nelson relies heavily on the
dignity clause and the state constitution's unenumerated rights
provision. First, Justice Nelson notes that the dignity clause
provides that dignity is inviolable, meaning it is 'incapable of
being violated."' 15 9 Second, he notes this interpretation is
consistent with "this Country's historical treatment of human
dignity as a central foundational ideal at the root of our concept
160
and system of ordered liberty and of our ethical tradition."'
Finally, he cites the testimony of Constitutional Convention
Delegate Wade Dahood on this issue:
[T]he intent of Section 4 is simply to provide that every individual
in the state of Montana, as a citizen of this state, may pursue his
cast upon his
inalienable rights without having any shadows
1 61
dignity through unwarranted discrimination.
Justice Nelson concludes that policies discriminating on the
basis of sexual orientation "are an affront to the inviolable right
of human dignity" and are therefore unlawful under the dignity

Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) and
its guarantee of a "fair hearing" in civil cases, required the government to provide free
counsel to indigent civil litigants"); Johnson, Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 89.
Switzerland's constitution contains a provision similar to the United States' equal
protection clause, and that country's highest court concluded in 1937 that indigents are
not equal before the law unless they have representation. Id. at 89. Germany has a
statutory right to counsel and its Constitutional Court has held that the constitutional
guarantee of a fair hearing may require that counsel be appointed for indigent litigants
where the statute does not. Id. at 90. Most notably, the European Court of Human
Rights held that the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms is intended to guarantee "not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights
that are practical and effective. This is particularly so of the right to access to the courts
in view of the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial."'
Id. at 90-91 (quoting Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979)). The court then
held that the mere possibility to appear in court does not provide. litigants with an
effective right of access and that the duty lies with the State to fulfill the Convention's
mandate. Id. Additionally, the Canadian Supreme Court recently held that New
Brunswick was constitutionally required to appoint counsel to indigent mothers
whenever it wanted to assume or maintain custody over their children. Id. at 106-107.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects "security of the person," which
could be analogized to Montana's dignity clause: 'The right to security of the person
protects both the physical and psychological integrity of the individual from state
actions." Id. at 107.
158. Snetsinger, 59 (Nelson, J., concurring)
75 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 832 (7th ed. 1999)).
159. Id.
78 (referencing Clifford & Huff, supranote 100, at 308-14).
160. Id.
161. Id. (quoting MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT 1643
(1972)).
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These rationales also apply to a right to counsel. First, to
require an indigent litigant in need of, and wanting, counsel to
proceed unrepresented is an affront to her dignity, dignity that
the constitution states is incapable of being violated. Secondly,
this affront to dignity is particularly egregious when the rights
at stake are also foundational tenets of our democratic
16
government-the right of access to the courts and to justice.
And finally, to force an indigent litigant to proceed
unrepresented interferes with the litigant's pursuit of
inalienable rights by casting shadows upon his dignity through
This discrimination is
discrimination. 164
unwarranted
particularly egregious when there are additional fundamental
rights at stake. This approach to the dignity clause further
supports the creation of civil Gideon.
C. Brief Discussion of Other Selected Provisions
1. The Montana Due Process Clause
Most traditional analyses of the right to counsel, in both the
criminal and civil contexts, rely on due process theories.1 65 This
166
holds true for both the federal and state due process clauses.
However, relevant case law does little to support the application
of the due process clause to a rights-based analysis of a civil
Gideon. 167 Although some might consider this to be the "death
162. Id. 79.
163. Johnson, Access to Justice, supra note 1 at 87 ("Equal justice . . . is at the
essential core of the U.S. system of government itself.").
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding "in a capital case,
where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making
his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the
duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law"); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (holding the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees a right to counsel for juveniles who are subject to delinquency proceedings
which may result in institutional commitment).
166. See, e.g., In re A.S.A., 258 Mont. 194, 198, 852 P.2d 127, 130 (1993) (holding
the due process clause of Montana's Constitution requires parents be represented by
counsel in termination proceedings); State v. Colt, 255 Mont. 399, 403, 843 P.2d 747, 749
(1992) (holding the right to a fair trial in the due process clause of article II, section 17,
guarantees a defendant the right to assistance of counsel in criminal cases).
167. An alternative due process approach to the right to counsel argument is an
"access-based" approach. See, e.g., Perluss, supra note 16, at 573 (arguing that the
Washington State Constitution's fundamental right of access to justice "requires a court
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knell" of the civil Gideon argument, the various state
constitutional theories outlined above support civil Gideon,
particularly when used in conjunction with due process concepts.
Classic interpretations of the federal due process clause
begin with the landmark Goldberg v. Kelly 168 decision, followed
by the legendary Mathews v. Eldridge169 and Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services170 decisions. The Mathews court
established a three-part test for determining what process is
due: 1) the private interest that will be affected by the action; 2)
the risk of erroneous deprivation and "probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards;" and 3) "the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
71
substitute procedural requirement would entail."'
The Montana court has applied Mathews in numerous cases
and contexts. 72 The Montana Supreme Court found sufficient
to consider, as a matter of fairness and justice, the litigant's ability to negotiate the
system of justice in which he or she is found."). Perluss further argues that "the ability
of the courts to exercise their authority to appoint counsel whenever necessary to ensure
access to justice and fundamental fairness is in fact a return to the basic traditions of our
system of justice."
Id. at 574 (emphasis in original). The Washington State
Constitution's clause relied on by Perluss is nearly identical to the Montana
administration of justice clause. Compare WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10, with MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 16.
168. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (concluding that due process requires a pretermination
evidentiary hearing before terminating welfare benefits).
169. 424 U.S. 319, 340-48 (1976). In Mathews, the Court determining that in
evaluating claimant's interest in Social Security benefits and the need for a
pretermination hearing, it should consider degree of deprivation, fairness of existing
procedures and administrative burden, and other social costs of providing the hearing.
Id. at 430-48. The Court balanced the factors and concluded a pretermination hearing
was unnecessary. Id.. at 349. The Mathews principles were reaffirmed in 2004. See
Hamdi v. Rumseld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). In Hamdi, the Court, upon balancing the
interests of "enemy combatants" in being free from physical detention with the interests
of the United States government in ensuring that citizens who fought with the enemy
during a war do not continue their fighting, the Court determined that "a citizen
detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive
notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker." Id. at 2648.
170. 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (creating a rebuttable presumption that parents subject to
termination of parental rights proceedings are not entitled to appointment of counsel).
171. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (referencing Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254). See also
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (concluding that where parent had right to appeal
decision terminating her parental rights, due process and equal protection clause
prohibited denying appeal due to parent's inability to pay for the transcript).
172. Although this analysis is limited to civil cases, there is a plethora of cases on
the criminal side that raise due process issues. An interesting criminal case that
addresses the challenges faced by indigent litigants is State v. Farrell, 207 Mont. 483,
676 P.2d 168 (1984). In Farrell, the defendant challenged his sentence, arguing that it
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due process in an unemployment insurance appeal in which the
employer alleged that the employee's failure to advise employer
of her testimony violated due process, 173 when a driver's license
was suspended without a pre-suspension hearing, 174 and where
a statute permitted the transfer of a juvenile from a school to
175
the state mental hospital for a maximum of ten days.
In other situations, the Montana Supreme Court has
applied Mathews, and found an absence of due process. In an
unemployment compensation case where the paper record of the
incident forming the sole basis for employee's discharge was
inadmissible hearsay, the court addressed whether the
claimant's due process rights were violated due to her inability
to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 176 Applying the
Mathews test, the court determined that the claimant had a
substantial interest in securing benefits, since benefits would
replace her wages, and her professional reputation was at
stake. 177 The court found the admission of hearsay reports
created a risk of erroneous deprivation and that requiring live
1 78
witnesses would not place an undue burden on the state.
79
Ultimately the court found due process violations.
was based on his indigency and therefore a violation of equal protection. Id. The court,
however, adopted a due process analysis, writing that "[tihe record indicates that
indigency may have been the criterion for imposing the sentence in this particular case,
and we therefore view the sentence in this instance as a possible infringement upon
fundamental fairness." Id., 207 Mont. at 498, 676 P.2d at 177. The court concluded that
it is fundamentally unfair to treat litigants differently due to their economic status. Id.
173. Wheelsmith Fabrication, Inc. v. Mont. Dep't of Labor and Indus., 2000 MT 27,
298 Mont. 187, 933 P.2d 713 (finding no risk of erroneous deprivation when employer
had notice of the contested issue and an opportunity for cross examination).
174. In re Vinberg, 216 Mont. 29, 32, 699 P. 2d 91, 93 (1985) (relying on federal
precedence and finding the government interest in highway safety justified use of a postsuspension hearing regarding driver's license).
175. M.C. v. Dep't of Insts., 211 Mont. 105, 108, 638 P.2d 956, 958 (1984)
(concluding that because the transfer to the hospital was only for ten days, it did not
result in the "grievous loss" presented in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S. Ct. 1254
(1980), where a due process violation was found due to a transfer from prison to mental
health facility for an indefinite period of time).
176. Bean v. Mont. Bd. of Labor Appeals, 1998 MT 222, 290 Mont. 496, 965 P.2d 256
[hereinafter Bean Ill.
177. Id.
36-37 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35, 340).
178. Id. 43.
179. Id.
43. For an example of the court's alternative approach to applying
Mathews in the due process context, see Welsh v. City of Great Falls, 212 Mont. 403, 690
P. 2d 406 (1984) (finding a due process violation but without a Mathews analysis). In
Welsh, the plaintiff firefighter was terminated due to a physical disability. The plaintiff
argued that he had a property interest in continued employment, and therefore was
entitled to a pretermination hearing. The court agreed he had a property interest in the
position, and found the failure to provide a hearing violated due process. Id., 212 Mont.
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Similarly, the court used a Mathews analysis to find
Montana's post-judgment execution statutes violated due
process.80
The petitioner argued that the post-judgment
execution procedures allowed the state to deprive him of
personal property without due process.' 8 ' The court held that
all Montana "judgment debtors" have a property interest in the
statutory exemptions, an interest protected by due process
guarantees.1 8 2 Applying Matthews, the court determined the
judgment debtor's property interest in the statutory exemptions
and risk of erroneous deprivation outweighed the state's interest
in executing the judgments. 8 3 Finally, it held the statutes
deficient because of inadequate notice and the absence of a
provision for a prompt hearing on the debtor's claimed

exemptions. 184
Given Montana's adoption of the Mathews standard, a
straight due process analysis is of limited usefulness in creating
a civil Gideon.
Applying the Mathews standards to the
parenting context, for example, factors one and two support the
appointment of counsel. The "private interest at stake"'8 5 is
parenting, characterized by the United States Supreme Court as
18 6
an interest "far more precious than any property right."'
Factor two, the "risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable
18 7
value . . .of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,"'
also supports the appointment of counsel. Procedures in the
abuse and neglect context are complex. 8 8 The Department of
Health and Human Services develops the factual record, and the
burden of proof is by a preponderance of evidence, 8 9 less than

at 405, 690 P.2d at 408.
180. Dorwart v. Caraway, 1998 MT 191, 9 83-103, 290 Mont. 196, IT 83-103, 966
P.2d 1121, 9 83-103 [hereinafter Dorwart 1], overruled on other grounds by Trs. of Ind.
Univ. v. Buxbaum, 2003 MT 97, 315 Mont. 210, 69 P.3d 663.
181. Id.
65.
182. Id.
75.
183. Id.
101.
184. Id.
103.
185. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
186. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) (finding that because of the
fundamental nature of the right at stake, that due process requires clear and convincing
evidence before terminating parental rights); see also M.G.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102
(1996) (holding that a parent cannot be denied the right to appeal a termination
proceeding due to the inability to pay for a transcript).
187. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59.
188. See infra Section V(A)(1).
189.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-422(5)(a)(ii)-(iii).
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that required in termination cases. 190 Parents often become
confused and frustrated with the process, and then fail to
Providing counsel helps assure parents
participate. 191
understand the proceedings and the necessary steps to secure
custody of their children again. In the custody context, similar
issues arise, although the arguments are not so compelling.
However, it is factor three, "the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
192
requirements would entail," that is the stumbling block.
Providing a right to counsel in abuse and neglect cases may be
manageable, but the fiscal reality of a similar right in custody
disputes is daunting. 193 Therefore, a due process analysis alone
is unsuccessful in establishing a civil Gideon for parents.
Montana's due process clause does support civil Gideon
arguments when used in conjunction with other constitutional
provisions, particularly the dignity clause. An analysis similar
to that adopted in K.G.F., Walker and Armstrong supports a
right to counsel for parents. Although the liberty interest at
stake in K.G.F is physical liberty, the right to parent is
comparably critical. When one applies the right to dignity to the
liberty interest, the result should be a similar finding, the right
to counsel.
2. The UnenumeratedRights Clause and Montana Code
Annotated Section 1-1-109
Montana's unenumerated rights clause, when combined
with Montana Code Annotated section 1-1-109, also supports a
right to civil Gideon. Article II, section 34 of the Montana
Constitution provides as follows: "Unenumerated Rights. The
enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny, impair, or disparage others retained by the
people."1 94 The Montana Supreme Court has rarely invoked this
195
clause, although arguably it has much potential application.

190. Id., § 41-3-422(5)(a)(iv).
191. Telephone interview with Judy Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Child
Protection Unit, Montana Attorney General's Office, July 16, 2004.
192. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
193. In 2003, there were 994 abuse and neglect cases filed in Montana district
courts, compared with 8,125 domestic relations matters. 2003 Judiciary of the State of
http://www.lawlibrary.state.mt.us/dscgi/ds.py/Get/FileRep.
24,
Ann.
Mont.
35920/annualreport20033rdl.pdf
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 34.
194.
195. See supra note 6.
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Montana Code Annotated section 1-1-109 provides that the
196
common law of England remains in effect in Montana.
Together, these provisions support the creation of a civil Gideon.
Montana's unenumerated rights provision was discussed at
length in a recent concurring opinion addressing private causes
of action for constitutional torts. 197 The plaintiff alleged that the
98
county conducted an unlawful search and seizure of his home.'
In "Dowart I," the Montana Supreme Court ruled that this
action was a violation of the constitutional search and seizure
and the right to privacy provisions, and that the post-execution
statutes violated the plaintiffs due process rights.1 99
On remand, the district court determined that the
defendants were protected by statutory immunity, and therefore
the plaintiff was not entitled to damages. 20 0 On appeal, the
court explored other states' approaches to this issue and
applicable federal decisions, including Bivens v Six Unknown
Narcotic Agents. 20 1 The court reversed, upholding the plaintiffs
right to sue for money damages for the state's violations of the
Montana constitution. 20 2 The court primarily relied on article II,
sections 10, 11, and 17, but said its position was further
supported by article II, section 16, the "right to remedy"
provision of the Montana Constitution, and by Montana Code
03
Annotated, section 1-1-109 and section 27-1-202.2
Justice Nelson concurred in the decision, relying on the
He would have based the
unenumerated rights provision.
decision solely on state constitutional grounds:
I firmly believe that, independent of any federal jurisprudence,
federal constitutional authority, the common law, or other
authority, the foundation for private causes of action for
constitutional violations is found in the language of Montana's
Constitution and in the proceedings of the Constitutional

196. "The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent
with the constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state, is the
rule of decision in all the courts of this state." MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-109 (2003).
197. DorwartII, 7 79-114 (Nelson, J., specially concurring).
15.
198. DorwartII,
103.
199. DorwartI,
200. Dorwart II, 17.
201. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that the Fourth Amendment limits the exercise of
federal power and an unlawful search and seizure by federal agents entitled petitioner to
recover money damages).
202. Id. 48.
203. Dorwart II, 77 44-45. "Every person who suffers detriment from the unlawful
act or omission of another may recover from the person in fault a compensation therefore
in money, which is called damages." MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-202.
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Convention. 204

Nelson noted the importance of utilizing the protections in
20 5
Montana's Declaration of Rights to protect individual rights.
He then relied exclusively and explicitly upon article II, section
34, referencing Montana Constitution Convention history:
In proposing this Section, the [Constitutional Convention's Bill of

Rights] Committee did two things: First, it recognized that the
rights enumerated in Montana's Constitution were not exclusive i.e. that there are unenumerated rights or 'rights beyond those
specifically listed' which are retained by the people. Montana
Constitutional Convention, Vol II, 645. Second, and important for
our purposes here, the Committee considered this Section to be '..
. a crucial part of any effort to revitalize the state government's
approach to civil liberties questions ....
[and that this Section] ....
may be the source of innovative judicialactivity in the civil liberties
field.' Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, 645.206

Justice Nelson concluded that there is "no better application
of Article II, section 34 than in the case at bar"20 7 to protect from
government infringement the rights delineated in the
Declaration of Rights. In order to enforce those constitutional
rights, "the people would, as they did, implicitly retain the right
to directly access the courts to protect and enforce their other
20 8
constitutional liberties."
In a subsequent decision, Justice Nelson also notes the role
of the unenumerated rights provision when combined with the
dignity clause. 20 9 Acknowledging a constitutional convention
delegate's view of this provision, as self-explanatory and that it
protects "rights which are not enumerated which the people of
Montana should not be denied."2 10 Justice Nelson argues that
classifications based on gender or sexual orientation are
classifications included within the ambit of the unenumerated

204. Dorwart II,
84 (emphasis in original) (Nelson, J., concurring); see supra
Section II (further discussion of the value in relying on state constitutions).
205. DorwartII, 77 96-97 (Nelson, J., concurring).
206. Id. 99 (emphasis added) (Nelson, J., concurring).
207. Id.
103 (Nelson, J., concurring).
208. Id.
107 (Nelson, J., concurring). See also Daniel Stackhouse, Right to a
Remedy-Cause of Action for Money Damages Is Available for Violation of Provisions of
the Montana Constitution Protecting Right to Privacy, Right to be Free From
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, and Right to Due Process of Law. Dorwart v.
Caraway, 589 P.3d 128 (MONT.2002), 34 RUTGERS L. J. 1331 (2003) (analyzing the
Nelson concurrence, Stackhouse responds to critics of the "primacy" model of state
constitutional analysis, and concludes that the Nelson approach was sound).
209. Snetsinger, $ 54-111 (Nelson, J., concurring).
210. Id.
93 (citing 6 MONT. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS 1832
(1972); see supra note 6.
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rights provision. He concludes that the operation of article II,
section 4 with article II, section 34 requires those discriminated
against on the basis of sexual orientation be treated as a suspect
211
class.
Focusing now on the: common law, the state statutory
provision provides that the common law of England is the rule of
decision unless inconsistent with other law. 2 12 At common law,
indigent litigants had the right to appointed counsel. 213 At the
time North America was colonized, England had a statute
guaranteeing free counsel for indigent litigants in the common
law courts, 21 4 a right that later was extended judicially to courts
of equity. 21 5 This statutory provision authorized the courts to
216
appoint counsel whenever needed.
Many American colonies adopted the common law of
England, 21 7 including indigents' right to counsel. Montana Code
Annotated, section 1-1-109, is the relevant Montana provision
adopting the English common law. However, this statutory
provision has received little attention from the Montana courts.
The first reported case addressing this provision concerned
whether a citizen, whose claim had been rejected by the court,
could be held in contempt for a newspaper account in which he
criticized county officials and the judge who ruled against
him. 2 18 The court stated, "[t]he common law of England is not
our birthright . . . it was and is ours by adoption and not by
inheritance." 2 19 The first legislative assembly did, however,
adopt the common law, to the extent it was not in conflict with
other law, and the provision has remained in existence with few
changes since that time. Under the common law, the citizen's
actions would have constituted contempt. After examining other
states' approaches to this issue and examining the constitutional
right to free speech, 220 the court ultimately concluded a finding
of contempt would be inconsistent with the constitutional free
speech provision, and therefore inappropriate.

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Snetsinger, 109.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-109 (2003).
See Johnson, supra note 2.
Id. (citing Statute of Henry VII, 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12).
Id. (citing Oldfield v. Cobbett, 41 Eng. Rep. 765 (1845)).
Id.
Id. See also supra note 16.
State ex. rel. Metcalf v. Dist. Ct. 52 Mont. 46, 155 P. 278 (1916).
Id., 52 Mont. at 50, 155 P. at 279.
MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 10.
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This statutory provision was addressed two years later in a
case determining whether a surety, standing in the shoes of the
state, had a preference to the claims of creditors. 22 1 Finding no
express statute or constitutional provision on point, the court
concluded the question had "to be resolved according to the
common law." 222 The court defined the common law as follows:
Broadly speaking, it means, of course, the common law of England;
but it means that body of jurisprudence as applied and modified by
the courts of this country up 223
to the time it became a rule of
decision in this commonwealth.
After reviewing authority on this issue throughout the
country, the court concluded the surety had a preference to the
224
claims of creditors.
Much more recently, this statutory provision was relied
upon, in conjunction with article II, sections 10, 11 and 17 of the
Montana Constitution, to support an action for money damages
for violations of self-executing provisions in the state
constitution. 225
Also referencing the statutory damages
provision, the court held that:
Either statute standing alone reinforces our decision based on the
legislative policy of this state.
However, when considered
together, and with the right found at Article II, Section 16 of the
Montana Constitution to a remedy for every injury, this
body of
226
statutory and constitutional law permits no other result.

These meager interpretations of Montana Code Annotated
section 1-1-109 shed little light on its applicability to a civil
Gideon.
However, if interpreted in conjunction with the
unenumerated rights provision, together they create a right to
counsel. The unenumerated rights provision references those
other rights, not explicit in the constitution, that are retained by
the people. The right to counsel in civil proceedings, which
existed at common law and is retained by virtue of this statutory
provision, is one such right. Just as the unenumerated rights
provision may justify additional classifications protected in the
equal protection clause, 227 it
may also warrant an
acknowledgment of a civil right to counsel for indigent litigants.

221.
222.
223.
224.

Aetna Accident & Liab. Co. v. Miller, 54 Mont. 377, 170 P. 760 (1918).
Id., 54 Mont. at 382, 170 P. at 760.
Id.
Id.

225.
226.

Dowart II,
Id. 45.

227.

Snetsinger,

44.
96-97 (Nelson, J., concurring).
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As author Justice Johnson writes:
[T]he existence of this right for some 500 years in the nation that
is the source of so many of the principles on which the U.S.
government is founded underscores the longstanding and
fundamental nature of the claim that free counsel
should be a
228
matter of right for poor people in the United States.
It is unlikely that, used independently, the unenumerated
rights provision could support right to counsel theories,
particularly given the paucity of case law interpreting the
provision. However, as Justice Nelson suggests, it can be used
to protect those rights articulated in the Declaration of Rights.
Just as Justice Nelson concludes that the Dorwart II plaintiffs
retained the right to access the courts to protect their rights, so,
too, should indigent civil litigants retain the right to counsel to
assist them in asserting their fundamental rights to access the
courts, to dignity, and to due process.

III. A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS: THE LIBERTY TO
PARENT
The most persuasive argument for a civil Gideon in
Montana arises when there are fundamental rights at stake.
The liberty interest in parenting is one such right. This section
utilizes parenting as an example of a fundamental right that
gives rise to the appointment of counsel for indigent litigants,
especially when multiple fundamental rights are at stake.
Following an overview of applicable federal and state law, this
section joins the fundamental right to parent with the legal
theories developed earlier to create a civil right to counsel.
A. FederalBackground
In a seminal decision regarding the right to counsel in a
termination of parental rights case, the United State Supreme
Court held that there is a rebuttable presumption that the
229
parent is not entitled to counsel in termination procedures.
The Court acknowledged that parents have a liberty interest in
raising and parenting their children. 230 In addressing the right
to counsel issue, the Court applied the balancing test adopted in
Mathews v. Eldridge and concluded the procedures in place

228.

229.
230.

Access to Justice, supra note 2, at 88.
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
Id. at 27.
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satisfied the due process standard. 23 1 Writing for the majority,
Justice Stewart concluded that this test did not dictate
appointment of counsel in this particular termination case,
given there was no risk of criminal liability to the parent, there
were no expert witnesses called, and, according to the Court,
there were no "troublesome points of law, either procedural or
substantive."232 In concluding states were free to impose a lower
standard for the appointment of counsel if they so chose, Justice
Stewart wrote:
If, in a given case, the parent's interests were at their strongest,
the State's interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error
were at their peak, it could not be said that the Eldridge factors
did not overcome the presumption against the right to appointed
counsel, and that due233process did not therefore require the
appointment of counsel.

A second critical decision regarding parental rights determined
that the standard of proof in a termination of parental rights
case is clear and convincing evidence. 234 Concluding that the
"individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both
'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere loss of
money,"' 235 the Court applied an intermediate standard of
review. The Court rejected the Lassiter case-by-case approach,
noting that litigants need to know the standard of review prior
to the proceedings. Applying the Mathews balancing test, the
Court concluded that the parents' interests were substantial,
236
potentially resulting in a unique and permanent deprivation.
Regarding the risk of erroneous deprivation, the Court

231. Id. at 31-33 (citing Mathews).
232. Lassiter, at 32.
233. Id. at 31. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
adopted a different view of the role of the due process clause in this context. He wrote:
[t]he Court has recognized that what process is due varies in relation to the
interests at stake and the nature of the governmental proceedings. Where
the individual's liberty interest is of diminished or less than fundamental
stature, or where the prescribed procedure involves informal decision making
without the trappings of an adversarial trial-type proceeding, counsel has not
been a requisite of due process. Implicit in this analysis is the fact that the
To say this is simply
contrary conclusion sometimes may be warranted ....
to acknowledge that due process allows for the adoption of different rules to
address different situations or context.
Id. at 36-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
234. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48 (holding "before a State may sever completely and
irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the
State supports its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence").
235. Id. at 756 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1982)).
236. Id. at 758-59 (citing Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2005

41

LAW
REVIEW
MontanaMONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
66 [2005],
Iss. 1, Art. 5

Vol. 66

determined that standards are imprecise and open to judicial
interpretation. Additionally, the state musters considerable
resources, including expert witnesses, its own social workers
and other staff, and "has the power to shape the historical
237
events that form the basis of termination."
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun emphasized
that, "because parents subject to termination proceedings are
often poor, uneducated, and members of minority groups . . .
such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on
cultural or class bias." 238 The Court noted the government's two
interests at stake: protecting the children and the fiscal and
administrative costs of the proceedings. Ultimately, the Court
concluded that a "stricter standard of proof would reduce factual
error without imposing substantial fiscal burdens upon the
State" and that a "clear and convincing evidence" standard of
proof strikes a balance between the parents' and the States'
239
interests.
Finally, a third federal case challenged a Washington state
statute that permitted a third party to seek visitation at any
time. 240 In this case, grandparents sought visitation over the
objection of the mother.24 1 The Washington state statute gave
the judge discretion to make the visitation decision, despite the
absence of proof of any harm, and to ignore the mother's
preferences. 242 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
concluded that the statute violated due process. 243 She noted
that the due process clause "also includes a substantive
component that 'provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and
liberty interests.' 2 4 4
B. Montana Background
Montana law regarding the rights of parents generally
mirrors federal law. Parents' due process rights arise in a
variety of contexts, including dependency and termination of
parental rights proceedings and adoption and custody cases.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Santosky, 455 at 763.
Id.
Id. at 767, 769.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Id. at 60.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 60, 75.
Id. at 65 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
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Parents' rights to the care and custody of their children are
premised on the parents' liberty interests derived from the due
process clause. 245 Montana's statutory scheme is designed, in
part, to protect these fundamental rights.
1. Dependency Proceedings
Dependency proceedings begin with the filing of a petition
alleging that the child has been abused or neglected, stating the
basis for the petition, 246 and seeking one of a number of
remedies. 247 The parent or guardian is entitled to notice of the
right to request an attorney and to contest the allegations. 248 At
any time, the court may appoint counsel for any indigent
party, 249 but currently there is no right to counsel prior to the
250
termination phase.
Upon a finding of probable cause that the child is being
abused or neglected, the court may issue an order granting relief
under the statute. 251 A show cause hearing must be held within
twenty days of the initial filing of the petition. 252 The court shall
explain the procedures and the parties' rights, including the
parents' right to request appointed counsel if indigent and the
right to challenge the allegations. 253 The court is required to
issue written findings on the issues and the child's placement.

245. See, e.g., In re J.L.S. and A.D.S., 234 Mont. 201, 761 P.2d 838 (1988); In re A.F.
and A.C., 2003 MT 254, 317 Mont. 367, 77 P.3d 266; In re Custody of M.W. and C.S.,
2001 MT 78, 305 Mont. 80, 23 P.3d 206.
246. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-422(2)(a) (2003).
247. Id. § 41-3-422(1)(a)(i)-(viii). The filing party has the burden of presenting
evidence to justify the relief sought; that burden varies from probable cause for
emergency services and temporary investigative authority to clear and convincing
evidence for a termination petition. Id. § 41-3-422(5)(a)(i)-(iv).
248. Id. § 41-3-422(13)(a)-(b).
249. Id. § 41-3-422(11).
250. The Montana Supreme Court follows the Lassiter criteria for determining
whether counsel should be appointed for indigent parents in different stages of abuse
and neglect proceedings. See, e.g., In re A.M., 2001 MT 60, 50, 304 Mont. 379, 50, 22
P.3d 185,
50; In re T.C., 240 Mont. 308, 314, 784 P.2d 392, 396 (1989) (relying on
Lassiter criteria, the court held that a mother was not entitled to counsel during
temporary custody proceedings). In practice, counsel are appointed for indigent parents
in selected Montana counties. Telephone interviews with Judy Williams, Assistant
Attorney General, (July 16, 2004).
251. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-427(2)(a)-(g) (2003).
252. Id. § 41-3-432(1)(a). Alternatively, the court may grant an extension or the
parties may stipulate otherwise. Id.
253. Id. § 41-3-432(4).
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At the adjudicatory hearing, which must be held within
ninety days of the show cause hearing, 254 the court must
determine "the nature of the abuse and neglect and establish the
facts that resulted in state intervention." 255 Following a finding
that the child is a youth in need, which must be by a
preponderance of the evidence, 256 the court schedules a
25 7
dispositional hearing and orders any required investigations.
The court is required to hold a permanency hearing to determine
permanent placement within twelve months of the initial
determination or within twelve months after the first sixty days
258
that a child has been removed from the home.
At the termination phase, the petitioning party must show
by clear and convincing evidence that termination is,
necessary. 259 It is at only this phase that parents must be
advised of their right to court appointed counsel. 26 0
If
termination is ordered, the court may transfer permanent legal
custody to the state, a licensed child-placing agency, or another
individual approved by the state. 261 A guardian ad litem must
be appointed to represent the child's best interests in the
262
hearings.
Exploring the termination phase, the Montana Supreme
Court ruled in 1993 that the guarantee of fundamental fairness
in termination cases has its source in the due process clause of
the Montana Constitution, article II, section 17, and that due
process requires that the parent not be placed at an unfair
disadvantage. 263
The court noted that the potential for
254. Id. § 41-3-437(1).
255. Id. § 41-3-437(2).
256. Id. § 41-3-437(2).
257. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-437(6)(b) (2003). The child may also be adjudicated a
youth in need of care at the show cause hearing. Id. § 41-3-432(9). The court may also
grant the state temporary legal custody under certain circumstances. Id. § 41-3-442(1).
The order for temporary legal custody is effective for six months, but can be extended
upon the filing of a petition by the county. Id. § 41-3-432(2), (4)(a).
258. Id. § 41-3-422(14)(a). If a child has been in foster care for fifteen of the past
twenty-two months, it is presumed that termination of parental rights is in the best
interests of the child. Id. §§ 41-3-422(14)(b) and 41-3-604(1).
259.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-422(5)(a)(iv) (2003).

260. Id. § 41-3-607(4).
261. Id. § 41-3-607(2)(a)(i)-(iii).
262. Id. § 41-3-607(5).
263. In re A.S.A., 258 Mont 194, 198, 852 P.2d 127, 127 (1993) (noting, "[w]ithout
representation, a parent would not have an equal opportunity to present evidence and
scrutinize the State's evidence."). Although the basis of the court's decision was the state
due process clause, Petitioner noted that the district court's failure to appoint counsel
also violated her statutory right to counsel. Id., 258 Mont. at 197, 852 P.2d at 129. This
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unfairness is especially likely when indigent parents are
involved because they often have "limited education and are
unfamiliar with legal proceedings," resulting in "substantial risk
that the parent will lose his or her child due to intimidation,
inarticulateness or confusion." 264 The court concluded that
Montana's due process clause guarantees an indigent parent the
265
right to court-appointed counsel in termination proceedings.
In a subsequent termination decision, the court concluded
that this necessarily means effective assistance of counsel. The
court stated as follows:
In the absence of effective, competent counsel, the right to counsel
is reduced to nothing more than a procedural formality. That is, if
there is no requirement that the counsel a parent receives be
effective, then the mere act of appointing counsel is meaningless..
. as the fagade of being represented by counsel casts upon the
proceedings a veneer of fairness and legitimacy that may not
actually exist.

266

Since the decision in A.S., the court has upheld its decision
requiring that indigent parents be represented by counsel in
termination proceedings. The court has continued to refuse to
extend this rule to pretermination proceedings. 267 However,
upon closer examination, it is apparent that there are
substantial risks for parents at the pretermination proceedings
268
that warrant the appointment of counsel.
269
In In re M.F.,
the mother argued she was entitled to
counsel when the state petitioned for Temporary Investigative
Authority ("TIA") because the state used the time between this
proceeding and the termination proceeding to develop its
provision, Montana Code Annotated section 41-3-607(4), was enacted in 1981 and states:
"At the time that a petition for termination of a parent-child relationship is filed, parents
must be advised of the right to counsel, and counsel must be appointed for an indigent
party."
264. In re A.S.A., 258 Mont. at 198, 852 P.2d at 129.
265. Id., 258 Mont. at 198, 852 P.2d at 130.
266. In re A.S., 2004 MT 62,
20, 320 Mont. 268,
20, 87 P.3d 408,
20. The
Montana Supreme Court rejected the Strickland v. Washington standard, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), stating that it does not go far enough to protect the interest of civil litigants when
a fundamental liberty interest is at stake. Id.
23. The court similarly declined to
apply the malpractice standard. Id. 24. Although the court found counsel in this case
to be ineffective, the court concluded that the parent was not prejudiced. Id.
31, 33.
267. See, e.g., In re Custody of M.W. and C.S.,
4, 27 (holding parents' liberty
interests must be protected by fundamentally fair procedures, which require the
appointment of counsel at the termination stage, but not before).
268. In contrast to state law, the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963
(2000), provides that parents are entitled to appointment of counsel during all abuse and
neglect proceedings.
269. 201 Mont. 277, 653 P.2d 1205 (1982).
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termination case against her. 270 The Montana court relied on
Lassiter and its analysis of the three-part Mathews test,
concluding that the same analysis should be applied at the TIA
stage as is applied at the termination stage. 271 Here, the court
found the state's interest in a just result to be great, and no
complexities that counsel could have assisted the appellant in
addressing. 272 The court explicitly rejected the Appellant's
argument that counsel was necessary at the earlier proceedings
because those events determined the relevant evidence for the
273
termination proceedings.
However, the court's opinions in recent cases indicate a shift
in direction. In 2001, the court found no due process violations
when a parent was unrepresented at the show cause hearing for
the order of TIA. 274 However, this particular parent, a mentally
ill patient confined at Warm Springs State Hospital, was
represented when the state subsequently presented its petition
for temporary legal custody and from that point forward. 275 The
court noted that "[s]ubsequent to the initial determination that
A.M. was a youth in need of care, the court reached the same
determination on at least three separate occasions-each at a
'276
time when B.V. [the mother] was represented by counsel.
While one can only speculate on the result had the parent been
unrepresented at all proceedings prior to termination, the court
may be shifting toward providing additional parental

270. Id., 201 Mont. at 283, 653 P.2d at 1208.
Id., 201 Mont. at 284-85, 653 P.2d at 1209 (relying on In re M.D.Y.R., 177
271.
Mont. 521, 582 P.2d.758 (1978)). Both decisions predate the enactment of Montana Code
Annotated section 41-3-607(4), which requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent
parent in a termination proceeding.
272. In re M.F., 201 Mont. at 285-86, 652 P.2d at 1209.
273. Id. See also In re T.C., 240 Mont. 308, 784 P.2d 392 (finding no due process
violation for failure to appoint counsel for pre-termination proceedings); In re M.W., 2001
MT 78, 305 Mont. 80, 23 P.3d 206 (concluding that father had no right to counsel at
proceeding regarding mother's termination of parental rights). The court did hold that
mother's due process rights where violated when, unrepresented by counsel, she signed,
on several conditions, a stipulation that her children were youths in need of care. She
later argued that DPHHS failed to abide by those conditions, voiding the stipulation and
any determination that the children were youths in need of care. The court held that
because the stipulation had the effect of adjudicating the children without any factfinding, it needed to determine if the mother's rights had been adequately protected, and
concluded that they had not. Although it presents unique facts, this case is an excellent
example of the critical role counsel can perform and the potentially grave losses to
parents whose rights are not adequately protected.
48-55.
274. In reAM.,
275. Id. 49.
54.
276. Id.
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protections.
This possibility is further supported by another 2001
decision in which a minor was simultaneously a youth in need of
care and a parent in abuse and neglect proceedings where her
277
own child had been adjudicated a youth in need of care.
Relying on In re T.C., the district court denied the mother's
request for appointed counsel during the abuse and neglect
proceedings, saying it was inappropriate unless the state sought
termination of parental rights. 278 While affirming its rule in In
re T.C. and In re M.F, the Montana Supreme Court stated that
it had never held "that appointment of counsel was always
'inappropriate' or otherwise precluded during the earlier stages
of child protective proceedings." 279 Justice Rice, writing for the
unanimous court, continued:
[T]his Court has not formulated any guidelines precluding or
making inappropriate the appointment of counsel in child
protective proceedings which precede termination proceedings, if
due process so requires. Rather, whether due process *requires
must
counsel to be appointed at earlier stages in the proceedings
280
be determined in view of all of the circumstances.

In this case, the mother was not represented at the time her
treatment plan was formulated and approved. The court stated
that the process for implementing the treatment plan must be
fair and reversed the termination order because the mother had
been unrepresented.281

In In re D.S. the parents were unrepresented at the TIA and
the hearing for temporary custody. 282 At the conclusion of the
termination proceedings, the court took judicial notice of the
earlier proceedings. In appealing, the parents argued that this
violated their due process rights. 283 The Montana Supreme
Court found no due process violations, concluding the court need
not have referred to those prior proceedings given the evidence
presented during the termination phase. 284 In a strongly worded
dissent, which was joined by Justices Gray and Trieweiler,
Justice Hunt wrote as follows:

14, 307 Mont. 358,

277.
278.
279.

In re A.F.-C., 2001 MT 283,
Id. 41.
42.
Id.

280.

Id.

281.

Id. IT 50-51.

282.
283.
284.

253 Mont. 484, 485, 833 P.2d 1090, 1091 (1992).
Id., 253 Mont. at 488, 833 P.2d at 1093.
Id., 253 Mont. at 489, 833 P.2d at 1093.

14, 37 P.3d 724,

14.

44.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2005

47

128

REVIEW
Montana MONTANA
Law Review, Vol.LAW
66 [2005],
Iss. 1, Art. 5

Vol. 66

Today the decision by the Court effectively sanctions a violation of
an individual's due process rights by the State. It is flatly wrong.
• . to incorporate judicial notice of temporary custody hearings,
where counsel is not present or mandatory, into its final order
terminating parental custody rights. To do so, and prevent the
parents from having the right to counsel, is to create the grave
risk of an erroneous decision. .

.

. A parental termination case

merits the utmost protection of the parents' rights to be
adequately represented

....

Substantiality of evidence has never

been an adequate reason to sustain a violation of an individual's
'285
right to counsel.

The Montana Supreme Court has not articulated specific
reasons why due process does not require representation of
parents during pre-termination proceedings.
Although not
stated explicitly, one can presume it is because the court
believes that the "temporary" nature of the findings does not
result in a permanent deprivation of the parents' liberty
interests under a Matthews and Lassiter analysis.
When one explores this potential rationale more closely, it is
less logical than it appears. As the appellant argued in In Re

M.F., during the time between the initial dependency
proceedings and the termination proceeding, the state is
developing the case against the parents. Social workers help
develop a treatment plan and work with parents to implement
it. Throughout this process, the parents' progress, or lack
thereof, is monitored and recorded. Interim judicial proceedings
address the parents' compliance with this plan. The record
developed during this time becomes of paramount importance in
the ultimate decision on termination of parental rights.28 6 To
conclude that the decisions made in the abuse and neglect
process are not permanent and therefore do not affect a
fundamental right is an overly simplistic analysis.
Those
proceedings ultimately have a dramatic effect on the result in
the termination case, which can result in a permanent loss of
custody.
Because of the critical role the state plays in
developing the facts that support the termination plan, it is
fundamentally unfair for parents to be without counsel in these
earlier abuse and neglect proceedings.

285. Id., 253 Mont. at 490, 833 P.2d at 1094.
286. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. 745. In addressing the standard of proof in the
termination context, the Court recognized the state's "unusual ability to structure the
evidence," and that "such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on
cultural or class bias." Id. at 762-63.
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Counsel is required at the termination phase, where the
burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence. 28 7 In the
earlier abuse and neglect proceedings, the burden of proof is less
strict, ranging from probable cause to preponderance of the
evidence. Given that these earlier determinations contribute to
the development of the termination case and require a lighter
burden of proof, it is doubly unreasonable, and unfair, to fail to
appoint counsel at these earlier stages.
Given the court's recent decisions on constitutional
principles applicable to this context, including the dignity clause
and the open courts clause, and the importance of effective
assistance of counsel in termination proceedings, the court
should reconsider its earlier decisions, expand the In re A.F-. C.
decision, and conclude that counsel shall always be appointed
for indigent parents in all phases of the abuse and neglect
process given the fundamental liberty interests at stake.
2. The Custody Setting
In defining parents' rights in custody proceedings, the
Montana Supreme Court has consistently noted that parents
have a liberty interest in the care and custody of their
children. 28 8 Preliminarily, the court has held there can be no
deprivation of custody or appointment of a guardian until the
2 9
parents' rights have either been relinquished or terminated.
Having acknowledged that interest, custody cases tend to
address two categories of issues: 1) the due process rights to
which parents are entitled by virtue of this liberty interest; and
2) whether or not a third party can obtain custody.
The court has examined the extensiveness of these
parenting rights in a variety of cases. The court has held that
courts have the authority to appoint Guardians Ad Litem
("GAL"), and parents have no right to participate in the
selection. 290 Furthermore, natural parents cannot be deprived of
287.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-609(1) (2003).

288. See, e.g., In re Krause, 2001 MT 37, 19, 304 Mont 202, 19, 19 P.3d 811, 19
(holding parents have a liberty interest in the custody of their children); see also In re
J.N.P., 2001 MT 120, 305 Mont. 351, 27 P.3d 953 (holding parent's right to care and
custody of child is a constitutional right that cannot be overridden by third party's
petition for custody absent a termination of parental rights).
289. See, e.g., In re Doney, 174 Mont. 282, 570 P.2d 575 (1977) (finding that sisterin-law who served as temporary guardian was not entitled to keep children absent
findings of abuse or neglect; court noted that parental rights are constitutionally
protected).
290. Krause, 19 (appointment of GAL is within court's discretion, and father is not
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their constitutional right to the custody of their children absent
29 1
a finding of abuse, neglect or dependency.
Regarding the rights of others to secure custody, the court
has held that a third party cannot intervene and petition for
custody unless the parent has relinquished his or her parental
rights. 292 The court said that a parent must "manifest an
intentional renouncement of the right to custody" and held that
293
incarceration is not a voluntary relinquishment of this right.
Similarly, a statute that allowed a third party to petition for
custody based on a "best interest of the child" standard is
294
unconstitutional due to the parents' liberty interests at stake.
In another case, the child's natural father gave consent to
temporary custody of his children to his sister and the district
court refused to terminate the sister's guardianship at the end of
the agreed two-month period. 29 5 The Montana Supreme Court
reversed, and awarded custody to the father, stating that the
careful protection of parental rights is constitutionally
required. 296 The court held that a natural parent cannot be
deprived of custody in the absence of a statutory showing of
abuse or neglect and the statutory "best interests of the child"
test cannot be used to award custody to a third party absent a
297
showing of abuse and neglect or dependency.

entitled to input into the decision; father is entitled to review records of GAL prior to
hearing).
291. Doney, 144 Mont. at 285-87, 570 P.2d at 577-78 (stressing the importance of
the parent-child relationship and the need to strictly follow the legislative mandates:
'There are ... few invasions by the state into the privacy of the individual that are more
extreme than that of depriving a natural parent of the custody of his children." Id.
292. Girard v. Williams, 1998 MT 231, 49, 291 Mont. 49, 9 49, 966 P.2d 1155, T
49.
293. Id., 99 35-44.
18, 305 Mont. 351,
18, 27 P.3d 953, T 18. See
294. In re J.N.P., 2001 MT 120,
also Erger v. Askren, 277 Mont. 66, 919 P.2d 388 (1996) (in stepparent adoption case,
court said that allowing adoption based on a "best interest of the child standard" does
not adequately protect the parents' rights or the child's rights to be with a parent). But
see Heather Latino, Erger v. Askren: Protecting the Biological Parents' Rights at the
Child's Expense, 58 MONT L. REV. 599 (1997) (arguing the Montana Supreme Court
failed to evaluate the fundamental rights of all the parties involved; if it had, the court
would have construed the statute narrowly to allow infringement on parental rights only
in limited circumstances and only to the extent necessary to protect the child's rights).
295. Doney, 144 Mont. at 282-85, 570 P.2d. at 575-77.
296. Id. at 286, 570 P.2d at 577.
297. Id. See also Erger v. Askren, 277 Mont. 66, 919 P.2d 388 (1996). Furthermore,
findings of abuse and neglect or dependency can be made only in proceedings commenced
by the county attorney pursuant to Montana Code Annotated section 41-3-101 et seq., not
in guardianship proceedings.
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Given the court's very strong language regarding parents'
liberty interest in parenting, should not parents be entitled to
representation in custody disputes as well? As in the abuse and
neglect context, the parent maintains an ongoing liberty interest
in parenting. Decisions in custody dispute matters alter this
relationship significantly, despite a preference for joint
parenting arrangements, and in many instances, negate one
parent's role in that process altogether. Given the interests at
stake, indigent parents should be entitled to the appointment of
counsel in custody disputes as they are in termination cases.
IV. APPLICATION OF MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS TO
CiIL GIDEON ARGUMENT

This Section applies the legal theories discussed above,
analyzes the viability of right to counsel arguments under each
of those theories, and concludes with recommendations on the
arguments most likely to succeed in Montana courts. The most
compelling circumstances for the creation of a civil Gideon are
when there are multiple fundamental rights at stake, including
liberty interests such as the right to parent.

A. The Strongest Case for Civil Gideon: The FundamentalRight
to Parent
The fundamental right to parent is at stake in abuse,
neglect and custody proceedings, just as it is in termination
cases. However, currently parents have no right to counsel.
Because there are multiple fundamental rights at issueparenting, access to the courts, and dignity-the Montana
Constitution requires more.
1. In the Abuse and Neglect Context
A parent facing allegations of abuse and neglect is
encouraged to participate in a series of hearings, with various
standards of proof, purposes, and possible outcomes. 298 An
indigent parent unable to hire counsel must proceed alone. The
state's evidence against a parent might include live social
worker testimony or documentation; expert testimony by
teachers, counselors, therapists, child developments specialists,

298.

See Section III, supra.
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and others; and testimony from potential eye witnesses. The
state essentially "creates" the record during the dependency
process, a record that ultimately supports the state's petition for
termination of parental rights if that becomes necessary. It is
well documented that the results in the earlier abuse and
neglect proceedings dramatically affect what happens in the
subsequent hearings and at the termination stage. 299 Given this
relationship, counsel is necessary at the earlier hearings to
protect the ongoing liberty interests that exist throughout the
dependency and termination process.
It is clear that article II, section 16 of the Montana
Constitution creates fundamental rights, including the right of
access to the courts, the right of open courts, and the right to a
remedy. The fundamental nature of these rights requires the
application of strict scrutiny. That litigants with resources can
hire counsel and those who are indigent cannot effectively do so
results in a classification sanctioned by the courts. Indigent
litigants appearing in abuse and neglect cases, where their most
precious right is at stake, are unable to effectively exercise their
fundamental right of access without counsel. Therefore, counsel
should be appointed.
Section 16 also creates rights without which other
fundamental rights have little meaning.30e There is no better
example of this than in the abuse and neglect context. As
Justice Nelson wrote in his Kloss v. Jones concurrence:
Purely and simply, access to the courts guarantees that other
Article II rights are something more than mere dreams and
the courts gives real existence to other
aspirations. Access30 to
1
fundamental rights.
This is precisely the issue in abuse and neglect proceedings.
Without meaningful access to the courts, parents cannot protect
their fundamental right to parent. In cases as complex as these
where a right as fundamental as any is at stake, counsel should
30 2
be appointed for indigent parents.

299. See Santosky, 455 U.S. 745.
57-58, 310 Mont. 123,
300. See Section II, supra. Koss v. Jones, 2002 MT 129,
9 57-58, 54 P.3d 1, 99 57-58 (Nelson, J., concurring).
301. Kloss, 58 (Nelson, J., concurring).
302. For an interesting discussion of the New York City abuse and neglect system,
see Sheri Bonstelle and Christine Schessler, Comment, Adjourning Justice: New York
State's Failure to Support Assigned Counsel Violates the Rights of Families in Child
Abuse and Neglect Proceedings,28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1151 (2001) (arguing that despite
a statutory requirement of counsel for parents, inadequate funding of the system results
in the needs of parents being overlooked). The authors describe the advantages of
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Montana's right to dignity further augments a parent's
A
liberty interest and further supports a civil Gideon.
"complementary" use of the clause suggests counsel is required.
Absent counsel, a parent is hard pressed to mount an effective
defense against such an arsenal of evidence developed by the
Department of Health and Human Services. What could be
more degrading and demeaning than to appear before a
tribunal, facing allegations of abuse and neglect as well as
general assertions of your weaknesses as a parent, without the
technical, strategic, and legal resources to effectively rebut these
allegations and retain custody of your children? It is difficult to
think of a more basic right and of a setting more degrading to
the intrinsic worth of human beings.
The dignity clause
complements the fundamental right to parent and requires that
counsel be provided to indigent litigants in the abuse and
30 3
neglect contexts.
Finally, Montana's unenumerated rights provision offers an
additional argument in support of a civil Gideon.
The
constitutional convention history demonstrates that the explicit
constitutional rights are not exclusive.3 0 4 Article II, section 34
was considered by the Constitutional Committee "to be . . . 'a
crucial part of any effort to revitalize the state government's
approach to civil liberties questions... [and that this Section]..
. may be the source of innovative judicial activity in the civil
liberties field."'30 5 Justice Nelson utilizes section 34 to further
protect the fundamental rights in the Declaration of Rights.
Requiring counsel be appointed for parents would do precisely
that, enable parents to "implicitly retain the right to directly
access the courts to protect and enforce their other

parental representation as follows:
The parent's legal representation in abuse and neglect proceedings directly
affects her access to counseling, welfare benefits, job training, or other social
services that are required by the court before her children may be returned
home or allowed to remain in her care. A parent's inability to access these
services because of lack of adequate counsel, deficiency of information about
social services, or bureaucratic backlog, produces an unstable and unfavorable
situation for the children.
Id. at 1199.
303. This is not to suggest children should never be removed from the home due to
abuse and neglect, or there are no bad parents. Rather, it is to say that each person,
with his or her own intrinsic worth, should be provided legal assistance in addressing
such serious allegations.
304. Dowart II, 99 (Nelson, J., concurring).
305. Id.
99 (Nelson, J., concurring); (citing 2 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 645 (1972)) (emphasis added).
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constitutional liberties." 30 6
2. Contested Custody Disputes
30 7
Custody cases raise similar fundamental liberty interests.
The confluence of the fundamental interests of parenting, access
to the courts, and dignity should result in the appointment of
counsel for indigent litigants in contested custody proceedings,
although the arguments are weaker here than in the
dependency context.
In a custody dispute, the court acts on one parent's request
for custody. Although this action probably constitutes state
action, state action is not required under the Montana
Constitution for protection under the dignity and equal
protection clauses. 308 Secondly, once a custody determination
has been made, a record is developed that is then used against
the non-custodial parent.3 0 9 The party that secures custody
initially has a much greater chance of maintaining custody
throughout and at the end of the proceedings. Although a
change in custody is a theoretical possibility, it is unlikely to
310
happen absent some dramatic change of circumstances.
Although the decision is not technically permanent, it may, in
effect, be permanent. Given these similarities between custody
and abuse and neglect proceedings, the right to counsel
arguments raised above also are applicable in the custody
context.

B. Application to Other FundamentalRights
The above theories also can be applied when there are
alternative fundamental rights at issue. When the fundamental
rights analyzed above-dignity, access to the courts, and
unenumerated rights-arise in conjunction with additional

306.

Id.

107 (Nelson, J., concurring); see also Stackhouse, supra note 210, at 1345-

50.
307. See Section III(b)(2), supra.
308. ELLISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 35.
309. This is similar to the dependency context, where the DPHHS staff develops the
record during the earlier proceedings, a record that may then be used to support a
termination decision.
310. Montana law requires a change in circumstances before amending a parenting
plan. MONT CODE ANN. § 40-4-219(1) (2003) ("The court may in its discretion amend a
prior parenting plan if it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior
plan . . . that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child and that the
amendment is necessary to serve the best interests of the child.").
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fundamental rights, this confluence may create a right to
counsel. Examples of other fundamental rights that may give
rise to a right to counsel include the rights to privacy, liberty,
equal protection, and participation; freedom of religion and of
11
assembly; freedom of speech; and the right of suffrage.
C. CircumstantialFactors WarrantingAppointment of Counsel
Some factual circumstances further justify the appointment
of counsel to indigent litigants. In many, although not all,
contexts, one cannot secure meaningful access to the courts
without legal assistance; therefore, lawyers are necessary in
some circumstances to protect this fundamental right.3 12 This
argument is enhanced by the dignity clause. This is particularly
true when one is confronted by an aggressive opponent with
aggressive counsel.
To appear in court, especially as a
defendant, and unable to meaningfully represent oneself or
defend the claim brought against you, is both demeaning and
degrading. Montana's dignity clause reflects the idea that
human beings "have intrinsic worth as individuals, and their
dignity is found, in one form or another, in their capacity to live
self-directed and responsible lives. 3 13
Additionally, many
uninformed, indigent litigants appearing pro se in complicated
matters are unable to respond to allegations in a self-directed
way.
Thus, the access to the courts provision, when
complemented by the dignity clause, results in a right to counsel
for indigent civil litigants in certain contexts.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The Montana Constitution is an insightful document that
anticipated many of the dramatic changes of the late twentieth
and twenty-first centuries. Like many state constitutions, its

311. A full discussion of the right to counsel in each of these settings is beyond the
scope of this article.
312. See Millenmann et al., supra note 78.
313. Clifford & Huff, supra note 100, at 303. One exception to this assertion may be
small claims court, where all litigants appear without counsel. MONT. CODE ANN. § 3525-505 (2003). Arguably, since neither litigant has counsel, the threat to the dignity of
one litigant is lessened. However, this is not likely to be the case when the litigants are
of uneven bargaining power. Examples include survivors of domestic violence, who may
feel a legitimate and ongoing threat from a former partner, and landlords and tenants,
particularly in tight housing markets. For a discussion of the "silencing" of tenants
appearing pro se in Baltimore's "rent court," see Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Courts:
Participationand Subordinationof Poor Tenants' Voices, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992).
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flexibility allows for creative protection of individual rights, and
the Montana Supreme Court is increasingly willing to rely on
these provisions for this purpose.
There is ample evidence that indigent people are unable to
secure counsel, even when their most basic rights are at stake.
The Montana Constitution is a resource that should be
leveraged to assist indigent litigants in securing counsel,
particularly to protect their fundamental rights. One such right
is the right to parent.
Under the various legal theories
discussed above, parents facing abuse and neglect proceedings
and unable to afford counsel should be appointed counsel by the
courts. Similarly, unrepresented parents in contested custody
disputes also should be appointed counsel.
The Montana
Constitution's
administration
of justice,
dignity,
and
unenumerated rights clauses, and Montana Annotated Code
section 1-1-109, operating together, dictate that parents' liberty
interests be protected by counsel.
Adopting a limited "civil Gideon" in Montana is the next
step in furthering equal justice for all Montana citizens. This
evolutionary process should begin in the family law arena given
the fundamental nature of parenting. To implement this right, I
suggest that the Montana Supreme Court adopt the following
approaches:
1. When presented with an appropriate case raising
these issues, apply the legal theories outlined above and
find as a matter of state constitutional law a right to
counsel for indigent parents in all abuse and neglect
proceedings and contested custody proceedings.
2. Work with the Montana legislature to implement
additional filing fee surcharges that can be applied
toward the cost of providing legal representation to
indigent litigants, particularly parents
in abuse and
314
neglect and contested custody cases.
3. Encourage the collection of empirical data on the
effect of having attorneys, paralegal assistance, and other
legal information available to litigants in the family law
area who are otherwise unable to afford counsel. Work
with equal justice advocates and others in securing
funding for a comprehensive study that would evaluate
not only the effect of having counsel, but also the effect of
securing alternative legal assistance, such as pro se
assistance, form pleadings, "ghost written pleadings,"
and information obtained from the internet.
314. The court should, however, continue to offer indigent civil litigants the right to
petition for a waiver of fees based upon indigency. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-10-404 (2003).
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4. Work collaboratively with the broader equal justice
community to evaluate the findings of the Montana Legal
Needs Study. 315 Based upon these findings and the
empirical data gathered pursuant to Recommendation
Number 3, work with the legislature to secure funding to
expand civil legal assistance programs to address these
needs.
Without trained, competent advocates, many indigent litigants
cannot maneuver through the maze of the civil justice system.
The Montana Constitution is a unique document providing
invaluable protection of individual rights. Its administration of
justice, dignity and unenumerated rights provisions should be
"mined" to provide indigent civil litigants a right to counsel.
Access to justice means meaningful access. We cannot allow
this tenet of our constitutional and legal systems to be
dependent on the charity of the government, the legal
profession, and individuals, particularly when such basic rights
as the right to parent hang in the balance.

315. The Montana State Bar, in conjunction with Montana Legal Services
Association, the State Bar's Access to Justice Committee, and the Montana Supreme
Court's Equal Justice Task Force, launched a Legal Needs Study in 2003. See Legal
Needs Survey Showing Results, 29 THE MONTANA LAWYER 7 (2003). Using a survey
form modeled after that used in Washington and Oregon and tailored to Montana with
the assistance of consultant J. Michael Dale, volunteers participating in this effort
interviewed 1000 Montanans. Only preliminary data is available at this time, but it is
anticipated that the findings will be useful in determining areas of need and how best to
utilize the resources available in this state to provide civil legal services to the indigent.
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